Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-121 23 June 1995

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EU Asks East Europe Not To Press for Accession

LD2306115895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0500 GMT 23 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The European Union [EU] considers it awkward that the East European countries keep pestering it about the date of their accession. According to opinions in Brussels, it could even speed up matters if the East European countries demonstrate more patience. Peter Zentai reports from Vienna.

[Zentai] The EU's message to us: Do not ask for a schedule regarding joining, and be content with the fact that Brussels is handling our endeavors with goodwill. This is the essence of the reply given to me at a Vienna news conference by Leon Brittan, who is a kind of deputy minister of the Union [as heard].

He was very firm and clear in his message to the East European and Central European applicants. It is extremely inconvenient for them in Brussels if they are forever pressed for dates. However, Brittan's words were encouraging in that respect, in that he took a stand in favor of accepting the reform countries and, what is more, called the expansion of the Union toward the East a historically unparalleled challenge. He said, literally as friendly advice, that the East European and Central European countries will be better off not to insist on obtaining a definite schedule on joining because, in that case, the present members of the Union will stall matters by using various excuses. However, if we left the subject alone, Leon Brittan, one of the most prestigious European politicians, hinted that we might have a pleasant surprise.

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Berisha, Meksi, Arbnori Receive Zieleniec

AU2306060995 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi received Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec. The topic of Meksi-Zieleniec talks was that of further developing bilateral relations in all fields—economic, cultural, scientific, etc. They underlined the Czech experience in developing democracy and the market economy, and the fact that the signing of the agreement on abolishing double taxation creates favorable conditions in increasing trade exchanges in the future and creates the possibility of strengthening bilateral economic cooperation.

The president of the Republic of Albania, Sali Berisha, also received Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec today.

After assessing this visit, President Berisha said that we consider with interest the further development of friendly, cooperative relations with the Czech Republic as a country with precious and advanced experience of reforms and economy. Albania, too, President Berisha stressed, is committed to a deep and radical course of reforms with important achievements in setting up a law-governed state and a market economy. In this context, real cooperation possibilities exist between our two countries in many sectors, such as tourism, transportation, etc. We consider the Czech experience in privatization to be very good and praise the assistance of your teams in this direction, as well the encouragement of Czech investments in our country.

Regarding foreign policy, President Berisha said that Albania, which still preserved the cult of Stalin and Stalinists in power in 1990, beside emerging from the deep isolation and determining its Western orientation, has placed importance on cooperation with regional countries and beyond, in which preventing conflict has been and remains a priority. Albania's rapid integration into Europe and its membership of various regional and international initiatives serves this goal.

Albania assesses the Czech Republic's support, both in its Council of Europe membership and the Central Europe Initiative and other European and international organizations.

After assessing the road of reforms Albania is pursuing, the Czech foreign minister stated that traditional cooperation contacts have existed between our two countries and underlined that they should be strengthened further under the new conditions. My visit serves this goal, he said. Zieleniec was of the opinion that there is cooperation possibilities in many sectors. Albania can be included in the program of assistance for development by sending teams of experts in privatization.

Zieleniec further assured President Berisha that Albania has the Czech Republic's support in its integration into Europe and beyond.

President Berisha asked Mr. Zieleniec to convey to President Vaclav Havel and Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus his desire to receive them in Albania.

This afternoon, People's Assembly Presidency Chairman Pjeter Arbnori received Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec and the group accompanying him. After the casual greeting, Mr. Arbnori delivered a summarized briefing on the democratic developments in Albanian policy and economy, stressing the key position of the parliament in undertaking the institutional and economic reform and approving 400 laws within a three-year period.

Serreqi, Zieleniec Sign Double-Taxation Agreement

AU2306061095 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 22 Jun 95

[Report by Aferdita Sokoli]

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning, official talks started at the Foreign Ministry between the Albanian delegation, presided over by Foreign Minister Serreqi, and the Czech one led by Minister Zieleniec. These are the first official talks in Tirana between the Albanian and Czech ministers in 35 years.

At the end of the talks, Serreqi and Zieleniec spoke about the results:

[Begin Zieleniec in Czech fading into Albanian translation] We generally discussed relations between the two countries. These are traditional relations that should be developed not only at a political but also at an economic level. The agreement to abolish double taxation that we are to sign is an indication that both governments support reciprocal trade and cooperation in the field of finance.

At the political aspect, I would like to stress that the Czech Republic highly assesses the fact that Albania is a democratic and stabilized country and stability in Albania is of great importance for regional stability. The Czech Republic is heading the Council of Europe presidency and would like for Albania to become a member of this council. I hope that as long as the Czech Republic heads the council's presidency, we will have the possibility, together with my counterpart, to be present when the Albanian flag is hoisted in front of the Council of Europe building in Strasbourg, Zieleniec said. [end recording]

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[Begin Serreqi recording] As my counterpart said, I consider the visit to be very important and a new step forward in developing bilateral relations. However, I would like to stress the fact that current Albanian-Czech relations are important not only on a bilateral plane, but also in multilateral dimensions. I hope that when the Czech Republic heads the Council of Europe's presidency, Albania will sign the act of full membership. I found out that there are prospects of further boosting relations in the political, economic, and cultural field. We also discussed how we can more fruitfully cooperate in multilateral structures for mutual interest, aiming at an accelerated process of being integrated into European structures. [end recording]

After official talks between the two delegations were held, Ministers Serreqi and Zieleniec signed an agreement on abolishing double taxation.

The Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Dylber Vrioni also attended the ceremony.

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Kozloduy Nuclear Plant Faces Maintenance Problems

AU2306093295 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 19 Jun 95 pp 13-14

[Article by Vesela Vaneva: "Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant May Not Start Up Four of Its Six Reactors in the Fall"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Governing Board of the State Fund for Reconstruction and Development [SFRD] voted on 15 June to grant a loan of 2 billion leva [Lv] for the National Electricity Company's [NEC] investment program. The decision came two days after Deputy Prime Minister Kiril Tsochev visited the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. There he was told that the plant needs about Lv6.8 billion for supplies of nuclear fuel and overhauling the generating units this year alone. The amount can be allocated in tranches, but for the first stage about Lv3 billion are needed.

If there are any optimists left in our energy industry, they would no doubt say that these Lv2 billion are just the relief that the nuclear plant needs, as it enters the busiest stage of its maintenance campaign. The truth is, however, that the nuclear power plant is unlikely to receive more than Lv150 million from the SFRD loan. The reason is that the money is earmarked for the NEC's investment program and must be spent on capital investments. Kozloduy's own investment program for 1995 costs about Lv300 million, so that the SFRD loan to the NEC has very little connection with solving the nuclear power plant's present problems.

The tragedy is that at present the Kozloduy Plant faces the prospect of being unable to start up four of its six reactor units, only because in recent years it has built up a very good image for itself in the eyes of society. Everybody—party, people, and state—believe that the nuclear power specialists are able to accomplish miracles in the shaman's tent on the bank of the Danube.

The news that is being kept from people's ears is that from the start of 1995 until now almost one-half of the money needed for maintenance and safety at the nuclear plant has not been granted.

The whole of the equipment at the nuclear plant has been maintained since the new year with only 60 percent of the money it cost last year. The comparison is in figures, because at present good tone in the power industry does not permit the accounts to be adjusted for inflation to any degree. The annual inflation in 1994 was 121.9 percent.

If the ministers were able to imagine the state that the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant will be in in three months time, they would call an emergency meeting of the cabinet right now, maintenance experts claim.

The Kozloduy Plant needs about Lv800 million for urgent maintenance work before the winter. At the moment it is not clear where this money will come from, but even this is not the most important aspect. Even if the NEC manages to take out another bank loan, there is a strong likelihood that during the following three months the nuclear plant will be overwhelmed with an avalanche of planned maintenance work on the reactor units that was put off during the winter.

In the last winter season the national electricity system operated practically without any reserve coal stocks. At times the peak loading was only 40-50 megawatts below the threshold separating us from electricity cuts. For this reason, the Kozloduy Plant was obliged to work to fill the gap. Accordingly the 440-megawatt No.1 reactor unit was not shut down for scheduled maintenance on 26 January, but continued to operate until the first signs of a thaw, that is, until 25 February.

The unexpected cold snap during March delayed by 23 days the major overhaul programs and the refueling of the 1,000-megawatt No. 6 reactor, which was supposed to be shut down for this purpose on 13 March. The delivery of the uranium fuel rods to the 1,000-megawatt reactor was also delayed due to failure to make payments to the Russian supplier and the Bulgarian tax authorities. Thus, there is some doubt whether the latest date announced for restarting the reactor—in mid-August—will be kept. In all likelihood, the maintenance work on the No. 6 reactor will, contrary to plan, overlap with the planned shutdown of the No. 5 reactor unit, which is supposed to be switched off for maintenance on 15 August.

Tonight, Kozloduy's 440-megawatt No. 2 reactor unit is expected to join the queue for planned maintenance and refueling. According to the plan, it is supposed to be ready for service on 1 October, when the first autumn frosts begin. The nuclear plant's September maintenance program will be further burdened by the 440-megawatt No. 4 reactor, which will require refueling around 11 September. Of the six reactor units at Kozloduy, only the No. 3 reactor will not be shut down for planned maintenance before December.

What will happen if the safety programs for some of the reactor units cannot be carried out because of lack of money or time? Kozma Kuzmanov, manager of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, was asked this question at a news briefing on 14 June. His answer was this: "Let us not cause panic among the people." Kuzmanov was asked the same question on 18 July 1994. On that occasion he said: "The plant's management has enough

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courage not to allow the reactor units to operate if the radiation and nuclear safety conditions have not been fulfilled."

Few people know that the prime minister is the only person who can order the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant to operate without the required radiation and nuclear safety guarantees. He has this power under the existing legislation. The Law on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of 1985 appoints the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy as the final authority entitled to issue permits for the reactors to operate or not. However, the legislators of the time were afraid that they would thus remove the switch from the hands of the executive and hand it over to the chief of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Therefore, they retained the prime minister's power to use his own judgment on whether to countermand the control body's prohibitions on the operation of nuclear equipment. This was decided during the eighties, when the Bulgarian language was enriched with the phrase "power cuts." From that day forward, Bulgarian prime ministers have handed on the nuclear control box to their successors.

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PRC Envoy Protests Visit of Taiwanese Premier

LD2306082795 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra today met with Chinese Ambassador Yan Peng. The meeting, whose main purpose was to hand in another protest against the visit to the Czech Republic by Taiwanese Prime Minister Lien Chan and his meeting with President Vaclav Havel and Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, happened correctly and without emotion.

The circumstances of Lien's visit were explained during the meeting as well. In this connection, Vondra said that Lien was not invited by any official institution and that his visit took place on the basis of a private invitation from Charles University.

ODS, KDS Chairmen Sign Merger Agreement

LD2206153095 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Vaclav Klaus and Ivan Pilip, the chairmen of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and the Christian Democratic Party [KDS], signed an integration agreement in Prague today. Marika Taborska reports:

[Taborska] The signing of the agreement today has launched an integration process that should culminate in the merger of the two parties in the spring of next year. As of today, the ODS and KDS representatives will take part in the negotiations of the other party's bodies. However, for the time being, they will have only an advisory vote.

The signing of the agreement was preceded by its approval by the ODS executive council and the KDS republican representative committee last weekend. The document still needs to be approved by the two parties' congresses, which will take place at the end of this year.

Ivan Pilip said today that the merger of the KDS with the ODS was a good thing for both the political programs of the two parties and the whole political scene.

Vaclav Klaus added the following: We expect that together we will be stronger than each of us on his own.

Delay in Temelin Plant's Completion Announced

AU2306115395 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 21 Jun 95 p 3

[Report by "(bar)": "The Completion of Temelin Will Be Delayed by a Whole Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Temelin nuclear power plant will be completed a year later than planned by the CEZ [Czech Power Plants] company, which is financing the project. The power plant will not be completed until September 1997, and it should begin producing electricity toward the end of that year.

The delay has been caused by CEZ's decision to accede to the requirements of the general supplier of technology for Temelin, Skoda Prague, with which it signed a new agreement yesterday. "This is the price we have to pay for the power plant's improved safety," said Vojtech Kotyza, a member of the CEZ board. According to him, CEZ had to completely redraft the project to ensure that the power plant complies with the most rigorous regulations.

The construction of Temelin had already been prolonged several times. According to the original plans from the beginning of the 1980's, the power plant should have begun operation in 1992. In March 1993, the government approved 1995 as the deadline for putting the first block into operation. The most recent version envisaged that Temelin would start supplying electricity in the spring of 1997. This past April, in its negotiations with Skoda Prague, the CEZ management had assumed that the completion would be delayed by only nine months.

CEZ and Skoda Prague yesterday made the joint announcement that the new deadline for the project's completion should be the last one. However, they have not absolutely ruled out a possible further delay. "But it should definitely not be a year," said Skoda Prague Director General Stanislav Svoboda. Kotyza added that high penalties for poor-quality work or a further delay of the project are also contained in the new agreement with Skoda.

Temelin will also cost 5 billion korunas [Kc] more because of the delay in its completion. The project should now cost approximately Kc76 billion. The increased cost of the power plant will mean a Kc0.04 rise in the price of each kilowatt-hour of electricity supplied by Temelin.

CEZ intends to make up for the loss of electricity from Temelin in 1997 by, among other things, increasing the output of the thermal power plants. People in northwestern Bohemia should not be aware of this, however, because CEZ plans to make maximum use of the desulphurized power plants and burn quality coal.

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Analysis of Refinery Situation Before IOC Entry

AU2206203795 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 20 Jun 95 p 10

[Article by "(pin)": "The Refineries' Consolidation Has Been Mapped Out"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The organizational and property interlinking of Kaucuk Kralupy, Chemopetrol Litvinov, and Benzina could take place by the end of 1995. The newly established Unipetrol holding company, which will thus become one of the largest enterprises in the Czech Republic, may even, in this case, get by without the capital input from the foreign IOC [International Oil Consortium] consortium, said Chemopetrol Director General Dusan Nepejchal yesterday.

A general agreement between Unipetrol and IOC has already been initialed by experts. The Czech Government and the foreign companies' administrative boards should discuss it before 30 June. According to LIDOVE NOVINY's information, the foreign consortium will pay "just under" $180 million to enter into the refineries.

At the moment, it is not clear how the exchange of shares will take place because the general assemblies of the two refineries, which were held recently, did not discuss this. According to D. Nepejchal, however, all of the participatory sides are interested in the establishment of the Unipetrol holding company because it will improve the domestic refinery-petrochemical complex's ability to compete against foreign producers.

Chemopetrol intends to invest 3.3 billion korunas [Kc] this year. However, it is continuing, first and foremost, with projects that do not bring an increase in profits, mainly in the ecological sphere. Therefore, at its general assembly, which was held last week, it was decided that dividends would not be paid from last year's net profit of Kc571 million.

This year, Chemopetrol, which is our biggest oil importer, wants to achieve a gross profit of at least Kc1.6 billion. According to D. Nepejchal, the company now has half of the diesel market, which is 10 percent more than in 1994. He added that, in automobile gas sales, its share of the market has gone up by 3.0 percent, to approximately 40 percent.

This summer, the refinery will introduce on to the market a new kind of unleaded 91-octane gas that has been especially developed for older types of vehicles.

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Ethnic Hungarian Leader on Council of Europe Vote

LD2306084195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak parliament ratified the minority protection framework agreement of the Council of Europe yesterday. The ethnic Hungarian deputies abstained.

Speaking about the abstention, Miklos Duray, chairman of Coexistence, said that they had rejected not the framework agreement itself but the way it had been ratified. The Hungarian coalition would have preferred the adoption of the Hungarian-Slovak Treaty first, with a decision about the minority framework agreement only after that.

Poll on Attitude Toward Ethnic, Other Minorities

AU2306105795 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 20 Jun 95 p 9

[Article by Juraj Alner: "Racism, Xenophobia, Anti-Semitism, and Intolerance; Results of Survey of Slovak Public Opinion on Intolerance"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Institute for Public Opinion Research operating under the Slovak Statistical Office conducts regular surveys of public opinion on topics listed in the headline of this article. The latest of them took place in March, and its results were made available to us only recently.

The intention of the survey was to ascertain how the public assesses the present situation in Slovakia from the viewpoint of the application of principles of tolerance, which is the basic prerequisite of democracy. [passage omitted]

Are We All Equal?

According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as according to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, all citizens have claim to equal rights. What do our citizens think about this?

A total of 84 percent of those questioned agree with this maxim. [passage omitted] A closer examination shows, however, that endorsement of tolerance can be purely theoretical and that people manifest themselves differently in practical situations. [passage omitted]

This is instructive: General statements, no matter how positive, cannot be taken at their face value.

The following table shows that our citizens have a truly problem-free attitude only toward Czechs, Slovak expatriates, Germans, and Poles. One in 10 respondents has a hostile attitude toward Jews and one in five toward Hungarians. Only 21 percent of respondents declare a friendly attitude toward blacks and Arabs and only 13 percent toward Romanies.

Attitude of the Public of the Slovak Republic Toward Ethnic and Racial Groups Living in Our Republic (in percent)

	A	B	C	D	E	F
Czechs	53	29	14	2	1	1
Slovaks who have returned from abroad	41	29	23	3	2	2
Germans	25	31	31	5	1	7
Poles	24	33	32	6	2	3
Jews	21	23	35	7	3	11
Hungarians	28	25	25	15	5	2
Russians, Ukrainians, Ruthenians	13	24	33	17	7	6

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
Asians (Vietnamese, Chinese, inhabitants of former Soviet Asian republics, etc.)	8	16	38	23	7	8
Refugees and immigrants of the white race	6	20	36	22	7	9
Blacks, Arabs	8	13	42	18	8	11
Romanies	5	8	20	36	30	1

NOTE: A = friendly; B = quite friendly; C = indifferent; D = rather hostile; E = hostile; F = unable to assess

[Passage omitted]

Romanies

[Passage omitted] Asked about the characteristics of Romanies to which they object the most, three-quarters of the respondents cited thievery and crime, more than 60 percent the shirking of honest work, and almost 60 percent poor personal hygiene. One in four respondents reproaches Romanies for "alcoholism, noisiness, and dishonesty." Only 2 percent of those questioned do not take exception to any trait of the Romanies! [passage omitted]

While only 11 percent of respondents are of the opinion that most Romanies in Slovakia are trying to make an honest living, 85 percent of those questioned do not agree with this statement.

A total of 59 percent of participants in the survey agree with the opinion that stricter laws and regulations ought to be applied to Romanies than to the "whites," 18 percent "rather disagree" with this view, and only 15 percent disagree completely.

Some 64 percent of those questioned would deport [vystahovat] Romanies to separate communities, and only 8 percent of the "whites" are clearly opposed to this. And 85 percent of citizens believe that, regardless of living conditions, the crime rate among Romanies will always be hi[illegible] than among the rest of the population. Only 2 [illegible]cent of our citizens dissociate themselves from this view, which testifies to firmly rooted prejudice. [passage omitted]

Jews

Views among the public on the Jewish community are relatively ambiguous. The survey registered a high proportion of uncertain, indecisive, and evasive replies. As many as 60 percent of the youngest respondents, those between 15 and 17, were unable to assume any stand on the position of Jews in the Slovak society in the past. The largest proportion of unequivocal replies were given to the question about the treatment of the Jews by the regime of 1939-45: More than 60 percent are of the opinion that it was cruel and unjust. Only one in 10 citizens does not identify with this view.

The Jewish Community Through the Optic of Public Opinion (in percent)

	A	B	C	D	E
The Jewish community commands excessive political influence in the Slovak Republic at present					
1)	8	17	19	12	44
2)	6	13	20	10	51

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	A	B	C	D	E
The Jewish community has an excessively large influence on the economy at present					
1)	8	17	18	12	45
2)	5	13	19	10	53
The Jewish community lived in the past at the expense of the Slovak nation					
1)	8	17	20	15	40
2)	5	13	19	11	52
The treatment of members of the Jewish community in Slovakia in the years 1938-45 was cruel and unjust					
1)	40	22	6	11	21
2)	36	22	6	9	27

NOTE: A = agree completely; B = inclined to agree; C = inclined to disagree; D = disagree completely; E = unable to assess; 1) Slovak Republic as a whole; 2) Slovak youth

[Passage omitted] How much do surveys such as the above tell us about the degree of tolerance among the citizens of Slovakia? When we compare the situation in various countries, we can say that there is still a great deal of intolerance in Slovakia. But in many comparable countries, there is no less intolerance and, not infrequently, even more. Moreover, no nation can be characterized by degree of intolerance. The most one can do is analyze the situation that it has reached and for what reasons, which is a job for historians and sociologists.

The publication of materials such as this serves only one purpose: Let us take a look at ourselves, and let us find a way of setting right what we dislike about ourselves.

Another 'Malfunction' at Bohunice Nuclear Plant

AU2306115595 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 21 Jun 95 p 1

[TASR report: "Another Malfunction of the Unit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jaslovske Bohunice—A malfunction [porucha] at the circulation cooling water pumps that are part of the cooling system for turbogenerator condensers caused a stoppage of the fourth unit of the V-2 nuclear power plant at Jaslovske Bohunice at 1028 hours yesterday. After analyzing the causes of the malfunction, the commission for investigating breakdowns gave its consent to the resumption of the unit's operation in the afternoon. The unit is expected to reach its full power output during the night.

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UN 'Uncertainty' Over Army Offensive's Aims

AU2206143195 Paris AFP in English 1256 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 22 (AFP)—The Bosnian army offensive to drive back Bosnian Serb forces appeared Thursday to have ground to a stutter just a week after it was launched. Artillery duels were reported in the Visoko region 30 kilometres (18 miles) northwest of Sarajevo and in the Majevica hills overlooking the Tuzla enclave, but elsewhere the army appeared to have lost momentum.

It seized control of a key road to the Bosnian Serb "capital" of Pale, but appeared since to have lost it. UN civilian affairs coordinator Phillip Corwin saying he used that route on Tuesday when it seemed "under Serb control." There is also uncertainty over who controls a road from Sarajevo to Kladanj, northwest Bosnia, which the Moslem-led government army had succeeded in cutting last week. Meanwhile the tortuous Mount Igman route into the Bosnian capital, the only road directly linking it to the outside world not under Serb control, has been closed for eight days by the army for "security reasons."

In Sarajevo the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) questioned the motives of the Bosnian strategy. "Either the army set only limited goals or it was not able to hold on to the positions" it seized, a spokesman said. Given the complexity of the offensive on several fronts it could have been merely to test Serb resistance rather than a wholehearted push to relieve the 38-month siege of Sarajevo.

The army—which refused to call its operation an offensive, saying it was merely "legitimate defence"—has kept quiet about its progress. Nor has the army published casualty figures although there are dozens of death notices for young Bosnians of military age appearing in newspapers.

UNPROFOR said the Bosnians had made a limited advance on several fronts in the northeastern Cemerska Planina region, although UNPROFOR military spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Gary Coward added it did not have "direct information" on that. "In any case we don't have access," he added.

Sarajevo was calm after coming under Serb shelling Sunday and Wednesday in which 13 people were killed and 30 wounded in the Dobrinja suburb. The past few days have also been marked by a hardening of Bosnian attitudes to UNPROFOR which they accused of "capitulating" to Serb forces.

The army seized heavy weapons held under UN control at collections points in the area, three weeks after the Serbs did likewise, and have been blocking 568 UN peacekeepers in the Visoko camp since Monday, threatening to destroy any UN helicopters trying to land there.

Meanwhile the Pale leadership urged expatriate Bosnian Serbs to rejoin their units, particularly Serbs originally from Sarajevo which was the scene of "the decisive battle...which will mark the triumphal end to the war."

In an interview with the BBC, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic rejected any suggestion his forces were losing ground. "This is an illusion that we are losing the war. Of course it's not easy for us being sanctioned by the international community and by Yugoslavia, but still we are surviving," he said.

Humanitarian Aid Convoy Reaches Sarajevo

LD2106182295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1747 GMT 21 Jun 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, June 21 (TANJUG)—A humanitarian convoy Wednesday reached Sarajevo after a one-month break in humanitarian activities, sources of the United Nations high commissioner for refugees in Geneva said.

Another convoy is expected to arrive in the city later in the afternoon, the sources said.

Bosnian Muslim forces in Sarajevo on Tuesday blocked four humanitarian convoys heading for Sarajevo under the (?premise) that the access road is too dangerous.

Sources in Geneva on Monday announced that an agreement had been reached with the warring sides to open a corridor for humanitarian deliveries which should bring into the city 470 tons of flour, 300 for the Sarajevo Muslims and 117 for the local Serbs.

The agreement has simplified the control procedures on the Bosnian Serb territory.

Supplies Not 'Sufficient'

AU2206124695 Paris AFP in English 1201 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 22 (AFP)—UN officials warned on Thursday that despite the successful delivery of aid to Sarajevo for the first time in a month, the trickle of supplies into the Bosnian capital and eastern enclaves will never be sufficient.

Mark Cutts, a spokesman for the UNHCR, said 430 tonnes of food reached Sarajevo on Wednesday and another 350 tonnes was planned for Thursday. Wednesday's was the first aid convoy to arrive in the city in

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over four weeks but will only cover one tenth of the population's needs for a month. "While we are pleased that we got a convoy into the Sarajevo area for the first time in over four weeks, it does not mean that the food problem is over," Cutts declared. "Food stocks are critically low and in the past we have relied on the humanitarian airlift to bring in 50 percent of the supplies. It's almost impossible we will be able to meet our target under the present circumstances," he continued.

UNHCR officials say they need to bring in 6,000 tonnes of aid into the Sarajevo area each month. This covers both the population in the besieged parts of the city and those areas held by the Bosnian Serbs. Aid deliveries to the capital have been blocked by the Serbs for more than a month. First they closed the city's airport in April and then following NATO airstrikes against a Serb arms dump in May they halted all aid convoys.

Earlier this month however they agreed to allow a limited amount of aid into the city. But under this new arrangement, the aid can only come in overland via a road entirely under Bosnian Serb control. To get there, the trucks must take a circuitous route over mountains. Once the convoy arrives at the Serb checkpoint, it undergoes exhaustive checks. On Wednesday these lasted more than two hours, Cutts said.

He said the arrangements were "inefficient, and it will be very difficult to change our entire logistical system to bring in aid overland. It will also be very expensive." Cutts said much of the aid for Bosnia was held in the Italian port of Ancona from where it was flown into Sarajevo by the international airlift. He said there were no plans yet to move this to the nearer UNHCR warehouse on the opposite side of the Adriatic at Metkovic, Croatia.

Problems have also arisen with the delivery of aid to the three government-held enclaves in eastern Bosnia despite pledges from the Serbs that the aid would be given free passage. Though two convoys have reached the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica, a third to Gorazde has been held up for five days at a Bosnian Serb checkpoint just outside the town.

The chief of staff for the UN military mission in Bosnia spoke with the Bosnian Serb army commander, General Ratko Mladic, on Wednesday evening about the delay but was told it was because of fighting in the area. UN military spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Gary Coward said the UN assessment was that there was no fighting in the area pinpointed by Mladic.

Presently, the UN chiefs of the mission in the former Yugoslavia remain unwilling to secure aid routes to the populations in Sarajevo and the enclaves by force. "It is the view of Zagreb (UN regional HQ) and UN headquarters in New York that we should work with the consent of both parties," a UN official said anonymously. "There have been some results with this approach with a trickle of aid arriving in Sarajevo and the enclaves. However, if that trickle stops we will have to look at other options including the option of taking convoys through without the consent of both parites," the official said.

Ganic, Gen Smith Discuss Cooperation, Liaison

AU2206150695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Late last night, Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and vice president of the Federation; Government Minister Hasan Muratovic; Osman Topcagic, secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and General Mustafa Hajrulahovic received General Rupert Smith, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and his aides. The topic of their talks was the alleged blocking of movement of the Canadian UNPROFOR troops near Visoko.

In the meeting, it was stated once again that there is no change in the regime of UNPROFOR's movement. UNPROFOR units can move freely, even across the lines of confrontation, but notifications of such movements must be sent 24 hours in advance. During the talks, it was established that this condition was not met near Visoko the day before yesterday.

Our side has expressed readiness for open cooperation with UNPROFOR and repeated that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina supports all UNPROFOR actions that lead to the better delivery of supplies to the population and facilitate the free passage of humanitarian convoys.

Gen. Smith stated that he had not been informed about the details of the incident near Visoko, which was reported in the media, and that, generally speaking, the UNPROFOR Command in Sarajevo did not attach great significance to this event.

It was agreed that future disagreements at local level be solved via liaison officers who would contact higher commands. If a dispute occurs, UNPROFOR Command for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Gen. Smith will settle it by contacting the relevant officials in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The top officials of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina conveyed to Gen. Smith the objection regarding the statements made by some UNPROFOR officers for the media before they brief their commands on the

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events on the ground. This was the case regarding the disagreement between the Canadian UNPROFOR members and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina near Visoko the day before yesterday.

Members of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina told Gen. Smith that such statements have proved to be damaging.

Sacirbegovic Views Situation, Future Options

AU2306085595 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 17 Jun 95 p 7

[Interview with Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic by Azra Kaurin; place and date not given: "Milosevic Requires Too High a Price"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the way from New York back to Sarajevo, Muhamed Sacirbegovic, the new foreign minister in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, participated in the work of the conference on Sarajevo in Vienna. He took over as foreign minister after his predecessor, Mariofil Ljubijankic, had been killed. The current situation around Sarajevo and the escalation of conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina have again drawn the attention of the international community. Mr. Sacirbegovic explained the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina for VECERNJI LIST as follows:

[Sacirbegovic] The situation is very critical at the moment. The question is whether the United Nations will and can do anything. Up to now the United Nations has only helped civilians with humanitarian aid supplies. The public was made aware that the United Nations took certain "half-measures," and all this considerably postponed the peace process. Now, we can see that the United Nations has been successful neither in "feeding" nor in defending the people. The UN scale is becoming increasingly one-sided. After everything that has happened and that is still happening, the question must be asked which role the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] plays in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its main role has in the last several days been to defend itself. Some countries oppose the idea that UNPROFOR should organize food supplies and take more severe measures, because this would place it in danger. Therefore we must quickly and seriously consider whether the situation can change.

How Long Will the Weapons Embargo Remain Effective?

[Kaurin] To what extent could the Rapid Reaction Force, which is coming to Bosnia, be a help in this respect?

[Sacirbegovic] The Rapid Reaction Force should be a decisive measure. We shall soon see to what extent it will help UNPROFOR fulfill its mandate. It could also be proved that they do not have an aim. Is is very difficult to say what can be realistically expected. The worst thing is that they know this themselves. I think that there is still no consensus among France, England, Netherlands, the United States, Germany, and Russia, which play the main role here. The soldiers will be English, French, and a small number of Dutch, but the United States, Germany and Russia play an important role too. They understand that Bosnia-Herzegovina is no longer what it used to be a year or two ago. We have reached a [passage indistinct] offered to us. We have created our identity in diplomacy and politics through our work and our soldiers. We are in a position where we can also say no; this is very important.

[Kaurin] The U.S. public has supported the lifting of the weapons embargo for Bosnia-Herzegovina. What do you expect of President Clinton? Is it possible that the crucial decision is made?

[Sacirbegovic] It is. I do not think that it will be expressed by the U.S. Congress. I think that President Clinton will veto it. Congress is exerting pressure. There is great discontent because of the UNPROFOR failure in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The administration itself will start exerting pressure too. There are people in the administration who no longer trust the policies that have failed. These three sides have merged into one, which is requiring that a more radical step be taken. It is probable that the embargo will be lifted. The only problem is England. France has a new president and a new government. There are some new politicians in France who do not support the old policies, although there are still some elements of the old policies. It is not the same, however.

The embargo is the key issue in public discussions. There are other key issues too, which are not part of the daily discussion in the media, however. Therefore, possible changes and all events in connection with UNPROFOR, the U.S. Congress, and the administration could have some new consequences. A very important question is whether the U.S. Administration will financially support the Rapid Reaction Force. The United States will not participate much with its soldiers and troops. What is required from the United States is $150 million for the support of the Rapid Reaction Force. The administration should propose to Congress the acceptance of this sum. Congress has already stated that it is not ready to waste money on something that has proven futile. The U.S. Administration is now trying to get a sort of confirmation from France and Great Britain that these troops will really do something, that they will not go to Bosnia-Herzegovina to preserve the status quo there.

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The Basis: The Contact Group Plan

[Kaurin] The Sarajevo government is very unhappy about Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the special envoy of the UN secretary general. What is, in your opinion, the role of the Japanese who, among other things, change the decisions on the UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina at their own initiative?

[Sacirbegovic] The situation has worsened since Mr. Yasushi Akashi and General Bernard Janvier came to Bosnia-Herzegovina. They could have made the situation better, however. There is a strong military power behind them—NATO. The UN soldiers certainly do not now have the weapons with which they could respond to Chetnik attacks. Mr. Akashi has always opposed the idea of bringing quality weapons to Bosnia for the purpose of defense. He has always avoided using NATO. As long as he had the money, he did not use it and cannot blame anybody else but himself. The situation is considerably worse than before his arrival.

The situation was deteriorating during his presence in Bosnia. It is not up to Akashi to claim there is no wish for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We signed the peace agreement, which the whole world interpreted as a prize for the aggressor. On the basis of the concept for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is apparent that at least two parties to the unnecessary conflict wish peace.

[Kaurin] What do you think about initiatives of the international community to hold a new London conference?

[Sacirbegovic] The conference is an attempt to withdraw from the positions of the Contact Group plan. Some countries will not allow this, whereas some require that this conference be held. We neither support a new conference nor new negotiators. New conferences can be convened, and new negotiators can come, but only under the conditions of the Contact Group plan. Permanent changes in negotiators have been fruitless. Everything has harmed our side. We cannot expect this to bring any changes. There are still people who are ready to help Karadzic and Milosevic.

From the West and the East

[Kaurin] It has been announced that Bosnia-Herzegovina could be recognized by Serbia. Does the Sarajevo government have any information about this?

[Sacirbegovic] I think that Milosevic requires too high a price for his recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It should be to his advantage to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina he would show the world that he wants peace, but he is not showing this at the moment. Our latest information speaks in favor of his further participation and cooperation with the aggressor in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If it comes to recognition, the situation will be favorable, but we do not want it at any price.

[Kaurin] Will your work be directed to the East or to the West?

[Sacirbegovic] It is understandable that I can be considered both a man from the East as well as from the West. I have very good relations with numerous Islamic countries, but I certainly have good relations with many Western countries. The question is not whether we shall work more, but what are objective possibilities. Islamic countries have done much; perhaps they could have done more. I think that this is only a matter of coordination.

[Kaurin] You have returned to your home country after having spent your entire life in the United States. How long do you intend to stay in politics?

[Sacirbegovic] When I started working in politics, I did not think it would last so long. After the United Nations had recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, I believed that the world would stop the aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This did not happen, however. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a young state that does not have people experienced in diplomacy. All of us who do this job now should analyze our importance for the state, not just the state's importance for us. I did not decide to become a politician to profit financially. I am young, and I do not have to worry how much money I shall have in my bank account for old age. Therefore I think that I shall be able to do a great deal for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The psychological moment also plays a role. One can become tired. I began the new work tired, but still with a new energy, a new hope. In spite of the bitterness we contain, because of all that has happened, there must be enthusiasm to complete one's task.

[Box, p 7]

Sarajevo

[Kaurin] Where is the solution to Sarajevo?

[Sacirbegovic] I am a diplomat and work on diplomatic solutions to the problem of Sarajevo. If I am not a successful diplomat, there is only one answer—our army. Our state and our army are entitled to solve this problem both militarily and diplomatically.

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Cooperation Between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

[Kaurin] How important is it for Bosnia-Herzegovina that cooperation with the Republic of Croatia is improving?

[Sacirbegovic] This is very important. A new level of relations between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is appearing. Many people claim that these relations are not what they could be. It is true that they must improve, but they are much better now than a year ago. This is a positive moment too, since it is possible for both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia to have greater control over their future. On the other hand, this is a dangerous moment for civilians and their suffering. The world has become used to the fact that civilians are a military target.

Comments on UN Behavior

LD2206130295 Berlin N-TV in German 1930 GMT 21 Jun 95

[Interview with Muhamed Secirbegovic, Bosnian foreign minister-designate, by an unidentified correspondent, from the "Villa Bonn" program; place and date not given—interview conducted in German, with Secirbegovic's replies in Serbo-Croatian fading into German translation]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Cambodia is a success, Mozambique is a success, Angola is a success, Bosnia is a failure, UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali has said with great disappointment. Our guest here today is a good person to be asked why this is so. He is Muhamed Secirbegovic, still Bosnian ambassador to the United Nations in New York, but also foreign minister designate of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Welcome.

[Secirbegovic] Thank you very much. Certainly, Bosnia has been a failure, but this was because most countries—unlike Germany—do not recognize the principles involved. Maybe they do recognize them, but they do not wish to commit themselves. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] The UN secretary general sees this completely differently. He has said Bosnia is a failure because the two parties lack the political will to achieve peace. The Serbs rely on military action, and the current offensive by the government troops is also a military operation. Do the parties involved really only believe in fighting, in war instead of peace?

[Secirbegovic] I think the facts will speak for themselves. We now have lived through almost 1,200 days of siege, the longest siege in modern history, in the last 500 years. At the same time, we have experienced a genocide in which our people, men and women, were destined for extinction because of their ethnic origin, where women were raped and forced to bear children. [passage omitted]

We have accepted all the peace plans proposed by the international community, all three of them. We did not even have an army when this war started. We do not have the wish to create our own country. We would like to maintain a loose federation in Yugoslavia, but we have found that we are the victims of aggression and genocide. Not only did we not provoke this, we were also not prepared to be involved in this. Now the UN secretary general says to us we lack the political will for peace. How many agreements are we supposed to make, how much longer are we supposed to be under siege? [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] One thing I do not understand: What have you gained from the offensive? So far, nothing—the road to Pale is back under Serb control, there were great losses, and the head of the Serb army, Mladic, says the offensive has been virtually stopped.

[Secirbegovic] First of all, I would not trust the word of General Mladic. His assessment is obviously good for his purposes. One of the things that were very important for us was not to allow the Serb forces to entrench themselves around Sarajevo. With the collapse of the exclusion zone and the fact that NATO is no longer stopping the Serbs from deploying weapons around Sarajevo, we thought we needed to take quick measures to prevent these weapons from being once again entrenched around Sarajevo. That we have achieved this is a success. But the third point, I think, is that we perceive this action as one that is going to take some time, and there will not be immediate and obvious success. And I guess the fourth and most important point is that we can even afford to take failure. We are fighting as underdogs, but at the same time we have learned to deal with failure. I do not even think that our operation here is a failure; maybe I will be proven wrong, but I think General Mladic's view should not be accepted here as being definitive. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Everybody, including myself, is wondering how you obtained the arms and ammunition for this large-scale offensive?

[Secirbegovic] We do not have the heavy arms and ammunition to engage in traditional fighting. We are having to rely to a large extent on the courage and the commitment of our men and women. Frankly, even the UN observers will tell you that the situation in Bosnia is still one where the Serbs have an overwhelming advantage in artillery and heavy weapons. On the other side, the Bosnians have the courage of their men and women. This is the strange thing about it, it is a very

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deadly balance, and we must be careful not to abuse it, because if we did we would be sending our young men and women to be killed by these heavy weapons. So our actions have to be calculated and have to be designed on the one hand to achieve results, but on the other hand to minimize the casualties to our men and women. For this reason, things seem to hardly go forward, as some would think, because we do not have large stockpiles of weapons in reserve. That means we have to take one step at a time.

[Correspondent] There are reports that the Bosnian government troops are still keeping some 650 UN Blue Helmets from leaving their bases. Your government says it is concerned about their safety, but on the other hand, observers say this is not true, the government troops simply want to prevent the Blue Helmets from gaining information about troop movements. Is this true?

[Secirbegovic] We are concerned about the safety of these troops—not simply because we are concerned for their lives, but because we do not want to see UN forces hurt in our country, so that maybe someone would blame us for not ensuring their safety. At the same time, yes, we are concerned that the UN forces start making reports to the world and that the Serbs will know what we are doing and undermine our strategic advantage. [words indistinct] But let me assure you of one thing. We by no means want to keep the UN troops from withdrawing, we have no demands on them.

[Correspondent] Now people have been asking what you really want. President Izetbegovic has been very critical of the United Nations, saying at the moment UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] is doing more damage than good and if things go on like this, the United Nations will become persona non grata. Could you explain this: is the United Nations really unwanted?

[Secirbegovic] No, we as a sovereign nation can tell the United Nations at any time that they should withdraw if they become a counterproductive force. I have spoken to President Izetbegovic and I asked him about the accuracy of this assessment. He said that in his view, the value and the usefulness of the United Nations is very much at issue right now. We need to continue to assess it. It is quite clear that the United Nations in Bosnia has played a dual role so far. One is the purpose of helping the civilian population, in particular helping to feed the civilian population and to some extent to help them survive the Serb attacks. [passage omitted]

On the other hand, if they no longer help the civilian population and are just there to help show the flag of certain countries or to help, as they put it, contain the conflict, then why should we in fact sacrifice ourselves in the interests of some countries who want to speak loudly, fly their flag in Bosnia, and contain the conflict, but no longer do those things that actually help our civilian population. For this reason, we say that we need to reassess the situation. But I wish to be clear—we have not made that reassessment and we are not asking the United Nations to leave; and when we do, we will just clearly ask: United Nations, please leave—at least those countries that are playing a counterproductive role, because we must also say there are some countries that play a very productive role and others, frankly, do not.

[Correspondent] What do you think about the Rapid Reaction Force; after all, they are the troops that are supposed to protect the protectors. Do you think this is a good idea? Does this force give you hope for peace?

[Secirbegovic] It is still very difficult to assess what impact they will have. Yes, clearly their major objective is to help protect the protectors, as you put it. On the other hand, by merely protecting the protectors, the protectors, that is, UNPROFOR, will maybe do a better job in fulfilling their mandate. Otherwise, we will maybe just have another 10 or 11,000 troops in Bosnia, with the United Nations doing nothing more than having these additional soldiers just sitting back as a contingency to maybe help evacuate UNPROFOR or maybe help them defend themselves in a situation where UNPROFOR comes under attack. If UNPROFOR does not contribute anything more than it has over the last few weeks as a result of this Rapid Reaction Force, then of course we think it is a bad idea. We think that then one should send some more protectors to protect the protectors and to protect the protectors. As a consequence, it may be better just to withdraw. If on the other hand, the result is to make them stronger to better implement their mandate, then we welcome it. But I am not sure that anyone yet knows what the results are.

[Correspondent] You know we have a fierce debate here regarding how German troops could be involved in Bosnia. There is talk of Tornado fighters. Do you wish this?

[Secirbegovic] Let me not speak in the context of the Rapid Reaction Force. Let me speak in a broader context. German involvement in the politics, in diplomacy, and the economic reconstruction of Bosnia is very welcome. The involvement of the Germans, be that the army on location or the air force, is something we would really support, but not something we would ask for. We have never asked for German men, we have never asked for Americans, French, or British men. We never asked that they come and fight our war. We have said if they are not in a position or not willing to to face the aggressor and establish the necessary balance needed for peace, then we should be given the opportunity to do this

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ourselves, by lifting the arms embargo. I think, though, there is a bigger issue behind your question, and that is that somehow Germany, because of its history, is precluded from playing an active role; and I think that the German people, maybe more than most other nations, have learned from history about the dangers of fascism and the danger that we see now in Serbia and Montenegro. I also think that the Germans can raise their voice on a practical as well as a military level and say: We ourselves are the perpetrators and the victims of fascism. We know its dangers, and we continue, maybe more than others, to be haunted by its consequences, and we wish in fact to make sure this disease does not spread through Europe.

Diplomatic Relations Established With Lebanon

AU2206143695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A document on the establishing of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Lebanon was signed in Tunis today. Nerkez Arihodzic, ambassador of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Tunis, and Sulayman Farah, ambassador of the Republic of Lebanon to Tunisia, signed the document on behalf of the two countries' governments. [passage omitted]

The Republic of Lebanon is the 64th country with which the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has established full diplomatic relations

Travnik Elects Deputies to Municipal Assembly

AU2206150395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 Jun 95

[Report by Refia Kulas from Travnik]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The process of setting up the municipal authorities on the principles of the federal constitution was completed today with the election of the head of the municipality and five deputies for the cantonal assembly of the Central Bosnian Canton of Travnik. Refia Kulas reports from Travnik:

[Kulas] As stipulated at the founding session of the interim Travnik Municipal Council on 4 May, the first working session of the council, which was presided over by Branimir Markunovic, elected the head of Travnik Municipality and five deputies to the highest legislative body in the Canton. Muhamed Turic, who has been president of the municipal presidency so far, was elected head of Travnik Municipality with no opposing votes.

In the Cantonal Assembly, Travnik will be represented by two deputies from the Party of Democratic Action, two from the Croatian Democratic Community, and one from the Left Bloc. [passage omitted]

Municipal Council Meets

LD2206230795 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Following many difficulties, a session of the transitional assembly was held in Novi Travnik. Here is Zvonimir Ciric:

[Ciric] Following several unsuccessful attempts, a session of the Novi Travnik Municipal Assembly, attended by 54 deputies elected at the 1990 elections, was held in Novi Travnik today. A decision on the organization of the transitional authorities was adopted unanimously. Standing orders were adopted and mandates were verified. Finally, the Novi Travnik Municipal Council numbering 54 members was set up.

HDZ [Croat Democratic Union] candidate Josip Udovcic was elected municipal secretary. SDA [Party of Democratic Action] candidate Salih Krnjic was elected Municipal Council president.

HDZ members Josip Udovcic and Zoran Matosevic and SDA members Salih Krnjic and (Bakes) Sainovic were appointed to the legislative body of the Vrbanja-Lasva-Lepenica county. The fifth member was not appointed because the opposition bloc refused to put forward its candidate because it rejects SDA and HDZ attempts to determine the candidate's nationality. That is, the ruling party had agreed that the fifth member in the county assembly should be from the opposition ranks and could not be a member of the Muslim or Croat nationality.

The session was attended by numerous guests, including Mariofil Ljubic, the speaker of the Constituent Assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation; Mirsad (Ceman), SDA secretary general and head of the coordination body for the implementation of the federation's constitution; and (Jerry Carter), UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] representative for civilian affairs.

Serb Official: Resume Negotiations 'Soon'

LD2206221495 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2049 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 22 Jun (SRNA)—Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, said today that all the possibilities for finding a peaceful solution to the conflict in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina will be used up unless the negotiations are resumed soon.

"If all chances of a peaceful and political solution to the war fail, the Muslims will for the first time have the

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international community against them," Koljevic told [Bosnian] Serb TV, commenting on the offensive the Muslims had launched on several fronts "before the eyes of the whole world."

In his capacity as the chairman of the State Commission for Cooperation With the United Nations and International Humanitarian Organizations, Koljevic said that the Muslim shelling of the humanitarian convoys was part of "a planned strategy again to accuse groundlessly" the Serbs of the humanitarian blockade of the Muslim part of Sarajevo.

"Regardless of all problems, we will continue cooperating with international humanitarian organizations," the vice president of the Serb Republic said and added that a humanitarian convoy for Muslims in Zenica had crossed the Serb Republic's territory this afternoon.

'Independent' Serbs Support Contract Group Plan

AU2306055295 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jun 95 p 10

[Interview with Milorad Dodik, a member of the Serb Republic Assembly, by Drazena Peranic; place and date not given: "An Alternative to Karadzic's SDS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Peranic] Milorad Dodik is the chairman of the independent group of deputies of the "Serb Republic." Along with Milosevic's "peacemaking" and dumping the incriminated criminals among the ranks of the top political leadership of the "Serbian Republic," it is this group's insistence on accepting the plan of the Contact Group for Bosnia-Herzegovina that seems to have become the strongest political means for breaking down Karadzic.

[Dodik] The club of independent deputies in the assembly of the "Serbian Republic" was formed at the end of last December as a result of our individual activities over a longer period. Along with the basic aim—to stop the war and eliminate the cause of the conflict—we also wanted to have within the "Serb Republic" itself an alternative political group that does not think in the same way as the ruling SDS [Serb Democratic Party]. Our group, which has just been joined in by one more deputy, consists of members of parliament elected in the 1990 elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, although they were on the opposition parties' lists. It is the fact that a certain number of members of the ruling SDS show interest in our political option, but rigid party discipline, as well as every other kind of discipline imposed by Karadzic's SDS, produces fear that precludes any kind of more active participation. In our political struggle, we proceed from the essential assumption that one can hardly reach peace with the people who have begun this war. The ruling groups at all sides are in fact assisting and supporting each other, and until the first one falls, it is impossible to expect any more permanent peaceful solution.

[Peranic] You are, in fact, the first voice of opposition heard on the territory under the control of the Bosnian Serbs. Could you present your precise view of the solution to the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Dodik] In my opinion, as well as the opinion of other members of the club of independent deputies, the establishment of peace is possible only on the basis of the Contact Group's plan, even more so as that plan defines a starting point for negotiations about a lasting peace. It is possible to set up Bosnia-Herzegovina on this basis within its recognized borders as a union of several constitutive units. If it is necessary today, there also may be a sort of internal bordering, albeit with constitutional guarantees regarding the equality of all its peoples and citizens. It is the war that has brought about the reality of internal borders. Nevertheless, on the basis of this plan, one can establish peace and offer the chance of life itself to introduce whatever is most suitable for these regions. Any other solution, be it war or the imposition of some other option, is neither realistic nor good for us.

[Peranic] Many atrocities have been perpetrated in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the court in The Hague has already publicized the names of the people most responsible. What is your attitude towards that?

[Dodik] Concrete punishment both for the perpetrators of the crimes and the factors responsible for their crimes are necessary more than anything in order to help a more stable peace. Amnesty for such a thing cannot exist, regardless of who the perpetrator of the crime may be. Any kind of politicking in the process of establishing criminal responsibility is the worst threat to peace.

[Peranic] Do you think that your initiatives will also be met with a positive reaction in the community you are coming from? Are you simply being optimistic or do you really think so?

[Dodik] It is only a matter of time until the political solution I am talking about will become a reality. If people want to continue living on these territories at all, it automatically means that the present alternative political option will have to be accepted.

Serb Official Warns Croatia About Attacks

LD2206225395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2211 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 22 Jun (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the [Bosnian] Serb

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Assembly, today accused the Republic of Croatia "of dictating and deciding on the extent of the war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina and of openly threatening the republic of Serb Krajina."

"Croatia has also opened the Sarajevo-Kiseljak front northwest of Sarajevo and forced the local Croats to take part in the aggression on Serb Sarajevo together with the Muslims," Krajisnik said in a statement for SRNA.

The Serb speaker warns that unless the Kiseljak Croats distance themselves from the Muslim aggression, the leadership of the Serb Republic will regard the local peace, which has been holding since the start of the war, as being violated.

"Croatia has been warned to replace the war option for the political one and to end attacks on the Mount Dinara-Glamoc and Grahovo areas [in western Bosnia, near the border with Croatia]," Krajisnik said. He added: "Otherwise, we shall be forced to punish them for their rashness."

The president of the Serb Republic Assembly had a message for Tudjman, Zubak, and other Croatian politicians: they should renounce the military option and "bypass Serbs if they wish themselves and their people well."

He described as insincere appeals by Muslim representatives for the halting of military activities and the normalization of the situation in the Sarajevo region, after their offensive was crushed. "We are offering peace throughout former Bosnia-Herzegovina, not just in Sarajevo, and we shall say this to the international mediators, Messrs. Stoltenberg and Bildt, if they come to the Serb Republic, but we cannot make any agreements with the Muslims," Krajisnik said.

Commenting on the invitation to citizens of the Serb Republic—who have been outside the republic for various justified or unjustified reasons—to return by 5 July [initial SRNA version read "August"] and take part in the country's defense, Krajisnik said that the Serb Republic leadership believes everyone should bear an equal share of the burden of war.

"The morale of our people has been particularly high, the highest since the beginning of the war, as a result of this decision. The people are determined not just to crush the Muslim-Croat offensive, but also finally to defeat the enemy," Krajisnik said. He added:

"The Serb Republic leadership has congratulated the armed forces of the Serb Republic and the republic of Serb Krajina, as well as all the Serb people from Knin, Mount Dinara, Krupa, Banija, Grahovo, Vozuca, Orasje, Zepa, Gorazde, Sarajevo, and Trnovo all the way to Trebinje on their solidarity, heroism, and determination to preserve freedom and every part of our republic, and to finally defeat the enemy."

Serb Deserters Face Criminal Charges in Milici

LD2306102595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0838 GMT 23 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Milici, 23 Jun (SRNA)—In keeping with a decision adopted by the Milici Municipal Assembly, a military department in this town will, by 5 July, establish a final list of conscripts who have left this municipality, so that criminal proceedings can be instituted against them.

All deserters on this list, who are now either in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or abroad, henceforth will be banned from entering the Serb Republic.

The Milici assembly also adopted a decision to confiscate both real and movable property from persons against whom criminal proceedings have been instituted and who are considered deserters, and transfer it to municipal bodies.

According to this decision, all property purchase and sale agreements concluded after 4 April 1992 are pronounced null and void.

Members of the deserters' families will be denied all financial benefits, as well as other rights defined by the state authorities.

Members of the deserters' families will no longer be allowed to hold management posts in state enterprises and institutions, but will be entitled to humanitarian aid. Minors previously receiving state financial benefits, will no longer be entitled to this form of aid.

These decisions by the Milici assembly refer to conscripts who are either in Yugoslavia or abroad, and who fail to join their units by 5 July or report to designated Defense Ministries.

Donations No Longer Buy Serb Army Exemptions

LD2206195595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1158 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Brcko, 22 Jun (SRNA)—All those who gave money to the army and were thus exempted from doing military service will, in keeping with the latest order of the supreme commander, put on their uniforms and defend the Serb Republic, Obren Markovic, head of the defense ministry's Brcko department, told SRNA today.

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He stressed that a large number of people from Brcko who have made donations to the army are already at the front.

Markovic stressed that the hitherto decentralized supply and financing of the army of the Serb Republic provided an opportunity for certain categories of the population to replace their military service with monetary or other contributions to military units.

"But the order of Supreme Commander Radovan Karadzic is quite clear on this issue: The supply of the army will be centralized and those who make monetary contributions to the army will also go to the front," he stressed.

According to Markovic, deserters are being given one more chance of returning to the Serb Republic by 5 July. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin's 'Serb Federation' Offer Praised

LD2206152195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1158 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 22 Jun (SRNA)—Commenting on a recent proposal by Russian President Boris Yeltsin for the creation of a Serb federation, Dubravko Prstojevic, the chairman of the National Radical Party of the Serb Republic [Narodna Radikalna Stranka Srpske], said today that this "will practically mean the creation of a unified Serb state, which is a historical goal about which the Serb nation has dreamt for centuries."

"The spirit of the Orthodox religion and patriotism is increasingly coming to the fore in Russia, from which the Serbs can only benefit—that can never be to their detriment—because the Serbs have always been a European nation fighting against militant Islam," Prstojevic stressed, adding:

"It seems to me that the Russians have grasped the essence of the conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and that what has happened to the Serbs over the past few years is only a trial balloon for developments that will take place in Russia, which is best illustrated by the Chechnya example."

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Military Expert Assesses NATO's Role

95BA0251A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 21, 28 Apr 95

[Article in two installments by Todor Atanasovski: "NATO After the Cold War"]

[21 Apr pp 32-33]

Shield of the New Order

[FBIS Translated Text] The problem of international security is much less a philosophical one, and far more a practical and extremely urgent one, because, at the moment, the world has much less of a collective security system, and much more of a lack and need of such a system. It is for that reason that the restructuring of NATO constitutes a global project.

In the current military and political situation, two realities are unavoidable:

—The modern military situation in the world cannot be explained without taking NATO into account;

—Because, overall, the global strategic situation is built and modulated around this more or less global military system, there is no possibility of resolving even a single major problem or complex situation without its involvement.

After the "disappearance" of its opponent, the Warsaw Pact, in its form from the time of the bipolar configuration, it was believed that that would probably be the end of NATO, and that it would be difficult for it to endure in the conditions after the Cold War. Those views were not unfounded. Even now, it is difficult to reject those theories completely, even though this military alliance and system's existence and functioning are very real. On top of that, tens of countries are waiting in the antechamber of this military alliance, wanting to place their defense and security within the framework of this military system. Several questions about why and what this could mean immediately arise.

In the first place, it means that the bipolar confrontation has not been ended. It is continuing, not just through inertia, but also in reality, though naturally in a different form. The relationship between the superpowers is continuing, though perhaps not in such an acute form. To make things worse, this is happening at a time when relationships have already been seriously dismantled after the fragmentation of the Warsaw Pact, and at a time when the collective security system based on the powers' mutual relationship has been relatively dismantled. In this situation, for example, Russia, as a successor (superpower), cannot assume all the obligations "from the former Warsaw Pact, and it is not even known whether it wants" to assume any of the previously agreed-upon obligations between the blocs.

In the second place, if confrontation is really occurring in any form whatsoever, especially if the new confrontations are occurring (which is true) in the former geospatial zones and on the edges of the former geopolitical boundaries, then that may mean that a significant part of the reasons that were successfully used in earlier times to maintain the tensions and mobilization of the military blocs and between them still exist. Those reasons have not been completely superseded by the fragmentation of one bloc.

In the third place, the very fact that a large number of countries want to place their defense and security within the framework of NATO means that those countries perceive a danger to their security. And, if most of those that want to put themselves under NATO's protection are former members of the Warsaw Pact, or more precisely from the geostrategic area that was previously under this military bloc's control, then that really is a fundamental change in the strategic situation, which could hardly fail to have serious implications.

In the fourth place, if "one side," regardless of the enormous specific weight of its power, that participates in the construction of the current (European and world) strategic situation is no longer expressing itself through a military bloc, then the other side, in this case NATO, will hardly be able to remain and endure solely within the former collective framework of behavior. It can already be observed that NATO is just as homogeneous in its internal relations and in the strategic sense as it was during the time of the bipolar configuration and pure military-bloc relations in an echo of the Cold War.

The inevitability of NATO's changing is obvious. The concept of the changes is probably one of the crucial problems. NATO is a worldwide, global military system. A world philosophy, strategy, and doctrine are needed in order for it to change. At this moment, for better or for worse, the United States is offering that with its ideas about the world order after the Cold War. Judging by the several years of debates and discussions about NATO that have been conducted within the framework of the alliance, significant differences in views can be observed, not just among the allies, but also within each country individually (Kissinger, Brzerzinski, Holbrooke). Actually, all those differences result from the fundamentally changed conditions after the dismantling of the Eastern military bloc. It seems that Gorbachev was right when he threatened the West and NATO: "We will see what they will do when their enemy is taken away." New relationships and antagonisms immediately appeared: NATO-WEU

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[Western European Union], NATO-UN, NATO-EU. There is no longer any doubt that NATO is aspiring to replace the collective international security system from the time of the bipolar configuration, and to act as its "successor." This is due to the new U.S. strategy, through which this country, which is undeniably the most powerful one in the world, is promoting itself to be the leader of the world and to assume responsibility for establishing the future world order. In the last few years we have been able to read and hear this several times, especially after the destruction of the Berlin Wall, symbolically ending the Cold War.

In addition to the above-mentioned relations, the NATO-Russian relationship is still the most noteworthy one today, and under that veil, even overtly, are U.S.-Russian relations. These relations have manifold significance:

a) The latest redistribution of power since the Cold War is occurring in this relationship. It is taking place (predominantly) in the extremely sensitive European area (the Visegrad Group and the Yugoslav wars). The United States, through NATO, is extremely present and involved, because at this moment Europe is the center of the world. Furthermore, thanks to NATO, this battle for the new postbipolar struggle can also be waged on behalf of West Europe and Japan, and thus some highly developed countries do not even have to turn their fantastic economic power into military power. After all, NATO is here, and there is no need to create parallel military systems and power.

b) The American ideas of the new world order are based on U.S. leadership in the world and on the creation of conditions in which that primacy will not be challenged, as stated in one unconfirmed (nor denied) document from the beginning of 1992, labeled "Directions of Future Defense Planning for the 1994-99 Fiscal Years." The "Directions" should be kept in mind because it would be immoral for what is indisputably the strongest country in the world not to reexamine its own doctrine, after a change as significant as the one that occurred after the dismantling of the opposing military bloc and the end of the Cold War.

The new global ideas (the new world order, and so forth) require a new and appropriate general strategy, including a military strategy, and naturally likewise the designing of military power, especially since the present rearmed world is not peaceloving at all. At this moment we can count 35 active or semiactive military hot spots on all the continents. "Obligations" also entail rights. If the United States has "burdened itself" with obligations to establish the new world order, then it is inevitable that through some acceptable form, U.S. strategy will be promoted to global strategy, and if that strategy really is a global one, in terms of the power that it is based on, then one can understand one of the positions in the "Directions," which state: "The United States has to be present in Europe, East Asia, and the Gulf area...." The United States has to have its hands free in places where the new world order cannot be consolidated. All of this—leadership, and the new world order, and the global strategy—actually constitute the foundation, but also the framework within which NATO's transformation will have to, and probably will, take place. By the way, various domestic and external obstacles will inevitably have to be overcome. After embarking upon a large worldwide social transformation, the restructuring and redesigning of this gigantic military system, the connective tissue of which is U.S. military power, will probably be the biggest military reform. History is not familiar with anything like it. One must bear in mind that a military system that is deployed at virtually all land, water, and orbital positions on and around the planet cannot be abolished that easily. One of the two such military systems is in the area in transition and for several years has been in an obvious crisis, which is not only its own, and in such a situation it is not a coincidence that its power cannot be ignored. If this is any kind of experience, NATO not only should not be abolished, but simply cannot be, because the international community is barely surviving the limited erosion of the Warsaw Pact and of Russian military power.

If one can conditionally accept this approach, then we are left with trying to envision the probable directions for the changes and the restructuring of NATO.

—NATO will not be able to remain closed, and just a defensive pact of the Western alliance, and from that position support or ensure the creation of the new world order;

—It will almost inevitably have to be restructured for its new role. A broader political internationalization of this military system is also inevitable;

—If it is not within the sphere of the unrealistic, NATO will increasingly assume the role of a UN force, a military system that would function within the framework of the UN and in accordance with that organization's decisions. That would actually imply other extensive changes as well.

Under the conditions of such a level of internationalization and the promotion of NATO into a worldwide military system for the UN, one can assume that future confrontations would gradually be transferred to a completely new area. There would be many fewer confrontations, for example, between West and East, North

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and South, developed and developing countries, and instead they would be between those that it would be more difficult to place within the new world system and order and the UN, on the other hand. Even in future individual bilateral wars, the UN, with its large military system, would back one of the sides in the conflict. One can conclude from this that the restructuring of NATO and its future are closely tied to the global goals facing the international community, something that is particularly significant from the standpoint of articulating the future world (collective) security system.

The problem of international security is much less of a philosophical one, and much more of a practical and extremely urgent one, because at this moment the world has much less of a collective security system, and much more of a lack and need of such a system. For that reason, NATO's restructuring represents a global project.

[28 Apr pp 20-21]

NATO's Swan Song?

[FBIS Translated Text] How can one interpret the statement by Russian General Lebed that NATO's expansion to the East, to countries like Poland and the Czech Republic, would lead to World War III, and Kinkel's response that no one has to ask the Russians whether and when NATO will expand to the East? From all appearances, we will not have to wait long for the confirmation or refutation of these assessments.

We took the real position of the United States, its power, role in international relations, and ideas about the future world order as the basis for the problems associated with NATO and its future role. To illustrate, we will cite just the preface to a rather extensive discussion by Colonel Bruce Clark, the director of the U.S. military college for the study of national security in Pennsylvania. An attentive observer will immediately notice the considerable overlap between the above-mentioned "Directions" and Colonel Clark's study (see BEZBEDNOST No. 3, 1994).

Bruce Clark says: "The results of the Gulf war and the new situation that arose after the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact allowed the United States to make the transition to a new national military strategy, based on the projection of force and the presence of the United States in the potential conflict situations in which there is a threat to some ally (formally or implicitly), or some vital interest. There has also been an increase in the possibility of the occurrence of peacekeeping operations in which the United States, as part of the UN's force for sanctions, will militarily impose solutions with respect to the enemy situation. In these two possible situations, the United States must have a clear decisionmaking process and doctrine with respect to what is being examined prior to such an involvement."

Different approaches and views, based on extremely significant positions, are also evident. It would be improper and irresponsible not to look at the opposing views as well. That is also significant for us because the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is openly advocating membership in NATO and in the Partnership for Peace, and so we naturally want to see and know what kind of NATO we want to join: NATO as a military pact for the defense of the Western alliance, the kind that still exists and functions in reality, or NATO as the future military system of the UN and a system that will be the foundation for the future collective security system, whose restructuring is one of the biggest global military projects, but still a project, and not just because of the Russians or some other power centers that might appear in the future, including Europe (the WEU), but also because of the nucleus of the Atlantic alliance and its philosophy, which is different from the U.S. philosophy. In the United States itself there are different views, which can be seen best from the latest observation by Kissinger, actually a criticism of U.S. policy in the post-bipolar period and conditions, under the title of "It Is an Alliance, and Not Some Kind of Relict" (THE WASHINGTON POST, 16 August 1994, translated by Straso Angeleski, Macedonian Foreign Ministry, in BEZBEDNOST XXXI, No. 3, 1994). Henry Kissinger analyzes U.S. (Clinton's) policy in Europe in all of the forms in which it is manifested, which is quite correct, because at this stage Europe is the center of the world and everything that happens here is of global significance. He does not believe that the dangers are past and thinks that "in the search for something new to its own benefit, it is preventing the study of history," and so he will also add that "even the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty never considered the recognition of borders (by that side) to be incompatible with the feelings of the satellite orbit.... Bordering on both Asia and the Middle East, it (meaning Russia—author's note) was never prepared to subordinate its relations with its neighbors to international decisions...." These are the arguments and lessons from history indicating that NATO should not alter its original defensive nature. He thinks that "it is too early for the integration of Russia into the world system as a 'pivot' and 'main element' of U.S. Atlantic policy...." He particularly criticizes the statements made by Bill Clinton during his first visit to Berlin for assigning Germany a role that its leaders did not request and that was not favored by its circumstances, while on the other hand he insulted Great Britain and France. At that time Clinton called upon Germany "to assume

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special responsibility for East Europe and especially for Russia." By calling the U.S. relationship with Germany "unique and singular," even as a courtesy, this call upset Germany's neighbors, and so Kohl had to repair the situation. Space does not permit a more extensive analysis of Kissinger's remarks, even though they deserve attention. Let us also take a look at the other controversies.

At the annual NATO conference (in Munich on 4 February 1995), "the lesson from Bosnia about the necessity of the unhindered freedom of military intervention" was stated. The statement by the animated German Defense Minister Wolker Rue is striking. He said, "Europe and the United States have to agree on the general political goals and strategies with respect to the basic issues of the complex world in the new era.... The Atlantic partnership must comprehensively solve the problems of the (Atlantic) community.... We want a transatlantic agreement.... A transatlantic economic and security community that will represent more than an Euro-American and NATO region of prosperity (alluding to the concept)...." NATO cannot be an instrument for others without corresponding effects. In the last sentence, he alluded to a possible new and larger membership that could dispossess the Atlantic nucleus. The interests of the alliance come before the interests of the UN. Rue continued: "In the future, NATO should act on behalf of the UN only if the political goals are accepted by all the allies, if there is a feasible military-operational concept, and if NATO can use its resources without restrictions." Europe thus wants NATO with its nucleus and has a different view of its expansion. The unknown factors are that Europe also advocates its own security identity. That has been increasingly more present in German-French military cooperation since the La Roche agreement a few years ago. The United States is paying more and more attention to these trends—in contrast to its previous crude rejection. On the eve of the Munich summit, John Shalikashvili was to state, "The key issue, among several others, is how NATO will cope with expansion to the East and even further, and how it will still affirm its leading role with respect to other security institutions. Thus, NATO will expand, and without doubt it will have the leading role among the other security institutions." The summit will provide an opportunity to reaffirm once again the existing nature of this Transatlantic military alliance, because the United States supports staying in Europe, and that is in the interest of its security.... "The United States (through NATO and across NATO—author's note) wants not only to stay in Europe, but also to reach agreement within the framework of NATO and cooperate with Europe and the European security identity; it (Europe) should become more flexible and cope with the organization of command and control that will allow it to operate even outside the area of operations that will be needed, for example to assist in implementing the peace plan that will possibly be achieved for Bosnia.... For those reasons, I think that it is time to conduct a significant strategic redirection in NATO regarding opening up to new requests for membership, regarding the Partnership for Peace agreements...."

The problems are thus extremely sensitive, and it is not surprising at all that there are so many controversies, even within the Western alliance itself. For that reason, EUROPEAN's coverage, following the example of the former Zonenfeld Doctrine, will advise the Eastern countries. "The countries of East Europe must not do anything (advocating greater independence) that would disrupt relations between Washington and Moscow...." We will take this advice as a theme in order to see Russia's reactions, as well, to a possible expansion of NATO toward the East.

I have already said that at this moment Europe is the "center of the world," and in this center two explicit focuses have appeared that are associated with the scope of NATO and its future role and international security.

1. Central Europe, especially the situation in the Visegrad Group, and

2. Southeast Europe, with the Balkans and the wars on the former Yugoslav territory, the Serbian-Croatian and Serbian-Bosnian ones.

Strategic spears are being crossed within the Western alliance itself in these two areas, and, which is most important, the focus of the confrontation with Russia is also in these areas. The latest reactions from this area went beyond all the previous ones for the last few years, and because they caused a real storm in Europe, we will just dwell on them, especially the writings of Boris Fedorov and Generals Grachev and Lebed. Fedorov's formula is "NATO without Russia is NATO against Russia," and so he proposes that it be admitted to NATO itself in order to check on how sincere the peaceloving promises are. "At that same moment we will get the genuine attitude toward Russia...." This reformist Russian intellectual "exposes" the Western strategic assumptions, thus vividly expressing the Russian view, for example, that two assumptions are dominant in the West:

"Our former comrades in the Warsaw Pact should be admitted to NATO as soon as possible, and it should cooperate with Russia, without its being integrated into the largest collective security system in the world." Thus, the entire attitude toward Russia is that there should be cooperation with it.

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"Also, one of the former blocs is enlarging itself in this way, growing, and what is left of the other one is Russia, in still undefined alliances with the former USSR republics.... It is not difficult to predict the consequences from this situation," Fedorov says.

The fact that this is a quiet but extremely systematic analysis of the current military-political trends in Europe, but also of global significance, will be confirmed most quickly by a statement by Russian Minister Grachev. Last year in Copenhagen an agreement was signed between Russia and Denmark on international military cooperation in the Baltic region, when the possibility of Russia's joining the pact was ruled out, and Grachev moreover expressed himself very clearly: "If NATO is transformed into a purely political bloc, and not a military and political one, then that would be a completely different matter...."

The problem thus lies in the fact that NATO is a military bloc. We will have to go back once again to Germany's "eloquent" defense minister on the issue of "Russia in NATO." "The Poles are learning English for NATO, but the Russians would demand that we all learn Russian.... I simply cannot imagine a Russia that could be ruled for a long time from Brussels...." At the same time, Rue advocates admitting the Visegrad Group to NATO as soon as possible. This openness is also creating trouble for the Americans (V. Perry and A. Gore).

With respect to the admission to NATO of the extremely "sensitive" Central European countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary), all of these statements will be outdone in directness and sharpness by a statement by one of the eminent Russian generals commanding the 14th Army deployed in Moldova, General Lebed. He told Czech reporters from the newspaper LIDAVE NOVINA: "NATO's expansion to the East, to countries like Poland and the Czech Republic, would lead to World War III.... The war would be caused by the Western military pact, and it would start the moment that NATO armed forces approached Russia's borders." When the reporter asked why NATO would go to war with Russia, the general answered, "An eighth of the world belongs to Russia, human resources of 150 million people, enormous natural resources.... They want to have it all, and that will not happen...."

It is unnecessary to state that these statements especially upset Europe, and especially Germany. That is why we will just dwell on the observation that NATO's expansion to the East is neither simple nor without risks. I will conclude this part of the discussion with Kinkel's reaction in the newspaper WELAM SONTAG, when he said:

"I absolutely reject what Russian Defense Minister P. Grachev and General Lebed said. Such relations are not in accordance with the friendly relationship of partnership between Bonn and Moscow...," and he added that he "could not understand Russia's position on the issue of regional security and the future goal of the Western alliance. No one wants to attack Russia." I will add that we understand Klaus Kinkel's concerns, especially when he tries to calm the domestic hawks by saying, "No one is asking the Russians whether NATO will expand to the East and when." As developments are taking place rapidly, we will not have long to wait for confirmation or refutation of these views.

As I have already mentioned, the Republic of Macedonia is among the countries waiting to be admitted to NATO. At the same time, it also has a firm European orientation. In following the controversies and even clashes in the behavior of various, individual, and collective factors on the international scene after the Cold War and after the dismantling of the previous bipolar relationships, one gets the impression that our policy and strategy are based on contradictions, especially with respect to relations in the broader international area beyond the Balkans. Although that is not our topic, today, in the existing extremely complicated situation, it is not at all possible to find better solutions than the ones found by our policy and strategy. Nevertheless, let us take a brief look at at least two aspects of the NATO-Republic of Macedonia relationship:

a) Whether our orientation carries any weigh in the overall relations associated with NATO that we have tried to illuminate, and

b) Whether that fact does not mean choosing a certain side in the postbipolar confrontations that cannot bypass this region either. For a small region, we have imposed big questions for ourselves.

For years now, the Republic of Macedonia, with its central Balkan position, has attracted the attention of international factors, both because of the wars that have taken place and are still going on in the sensitive southeast of Europe, and because of the depth that reaches the eastern Mediterranean and beyond. That fact is not as apparent when there is peace here. Nevertheless, if we assume a destructive situation, it is immediately apparent that a chain-reaction spreading of the war on all sides is unavoidable. It is thus truly significant, not only how we arrange our defense and security, but also how the world arranges security in this region. Our motive for joining NATO is exclusively associated with our security, and in support of collective security. The Republic of Macedonia is bearing in mind not the NATO from the period of bipolar confrontations,

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but rather NATO as a basis and support in the process of the revitalization of the international security system. On the other hand, if I may paraphrase General Lebed, there is no danger that with the admission of the Republic of Macedonia to NATO armies from the West will break through to Russia's borders, as he is assuming in the case of the Visegrad Group. The admission of the Republic of Macedonia would also be an argument for "the Western side" that NATO's expansion would not always have to mean a military expansion and just a multiplication of military power. Judging by our behavior to date, the admission of the Republic of Macedonia should not be a threat to anyone.

Customs Director Iljovski Discusses Corruption

95BA0259A Skopje VECER in Macedonian 20-21 May 95 pp 6-7

[Interview with Ilija Iljovski by Vasko Eftov; place and date not given: "Clean People on the Border!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] They say that Ilija Iljovski is one of the team of SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] "young lions" who have been launched on the political stage of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] in the last few years, and precisely in the position of director of the Customs Administration, from which his predecessor, D. Buzlevski, created a rapid political career. With his technocratic views, Iljovski is at this time somewhere halfway between his former membership in the directors' faction and his present status as a representative of the political elite. In any case, he supports more significant penetration of the authorities by businessmen. Naturally, he also supports Germanic discipline in operation (that commitment was probably "encoded" in his memory during his stay in Frankfurt).

EMO for a Run

[Eftov] Mr. Iljovski, last year you were selected as chairman of the board of directors of the Makedonija JP [Public Enterprise] for airport services, and about three months ago as director of the Customs Administration. To what is that acceleration of your career due?

[Iljovski] Probably to my successes as general director of EMO [Ohrid Electric Power Installation Enterprise].

In my opinion, I took over EMO in its most critical phase, and in the next two and a half years, together with others on the management team, I traced the path for its improved operation.

[Eftov] Did you come to be EMO's general director during the period after the departure of Maglievski Pasha?

[Iljovski] No, Voislav Pejovski became general director then. He is now director of the Agency for Economically Underdeveloped Areas. During that period I was the deputy general director and I spent some time in France, with the idea of opening an EMO firm there. In that wave of strikes that seized the Bitola-Ohrid region, however, in my opinion, there was a vulgar replacement of the then general director, who was asked to increase wages by 120 percent!

[Eftov] After your departure from EMO to become director of the Customs Administration, there was another strike at the enterprise and the board of directors was replaced. Wasn't that precisely at the time when EMO succeeded in winning a deal worth about 40 million German marks [DM]?

[Iljovski] That deal was certain while I was still at EMO, although the Spanish competitor had an incredible lobby at the European Bank. In the end, however, our country and the Electrical Industry managed to get us the job. In those conditions, it did not even occur to me that there would be another strike at EMO after I left. Actually, disgust among the workers caused the decision by the board of directors to have the Pasha's former deputy, now a retiree, selected as acting director. That caused a certain impatience within management itself, and the replacement of the board of directors, and three days ago a new board of directors was elected.

[Eftov] As chairman of the board of directors of the Makedonija Public Enterprise, how did you comment on the replacement of the Skopje Airport director, Blagoja Filipovski?

[Iljovski] As the board of directors, we are in an extremely passive position, because at this time we have only assumed the powers of the enterprise's former workers' council. The very decision to replace Filipovski was made by the director of the Makedonija Public Enterprise, Zoran Krstevski, without prior consultations with the members of the board of directors and with me as chairman of that board. Krstevski said, however, as he later explained to me, that Filipovski himself had submitted a request to be transferred to be assistant director of the Public Enterprise.

Changed Uniform

[Eftov] You went from being EMO's general director to become the country's top customs officer. Your predecessor, Dimitar Buzlevski, was the financial director of Agroplod. In any case, the public has conflicting views on whether it is advisable for successful businessmen to be installed as director of the Customs Administration, or even to have professional politicians appointed to it, in view of the power concentrated there.

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[Iljovski] As soon as Buzlevski was elected as minister of transportation, I knew that the position of customs director was waiting for me.

[Eftov] It was some sort of party pact?

[Iljovski] I don't know whether it was a party pact, but it was suggested to me that I accept that job.

[Eftov] Who suggested it, if that is not a secret?

[Iljovski] It is no secret at all: At the time of the discussion of the distribution of ministerial positions in the SDSM Central Committee (I am a member of that committee), it was pointed out to me that such an option was possible, and that I needed to think about that issue. I must say that the Chamber of Commerce strongly supported my selection as customs director, with the opinion that it was favorable to have a businessman in that position. In any case, my personal position is that it is always good to have a businessman in that position.

[Eftov] Your answer reflects certain technocratic views about a more significant presence for businessmen in the government. In any case, that talk about the strength of the directors' lobby and the need for it to be more involved in the creation of economic policy has been quite present for some time. Until three months ago, you were on the businessmen's team, and now you are wearing the government's uniform: What is your opinion about that issue?

[Iljovski] Big systems and big directors cannot be without any influence in the government, although there is an opinion that businessmen interfere in the government a lot through the Chamber. That theory, however, has to be supplemented with the fact that the government was established for the sake of the businessmen, and not the other way around. The authorities should only outline the overall framework for economic activity. That is why I think that there will always be that intermingling between the government and the directors.

[Eftov] Your arrival at Customs coincided with the scandal over the smuggling of oil-drilling equipment that was supposed to arrive in Serbia. What was the outcome of the whole thing?

[Iljovski] At almost the same time, there was a replacement at Macedonian Customs and a turnover in the Sanctions Committee mission: The Canadian delegation was replaced by the Dutch one. Actually, it was from the Dutch Mission that we received the information that there was an organized convoy going from Iran, through Greece and Bulgaria, and entering Macedonia with an ultimate destination in Serbia. In any case, the confiscated goods are now under customs supervision (they can stay there for a period of one year) with two possible options: being sent back, or having the customs duties paid and staying in Macedonia. Likewise, an investigation has begun of the involvement of Macedonian firms in this scandal, but it is already going beyond the jurisdiction of Customs.

Customs Permeability

[Eftov] Later you had one more attempt to have some of that equipment smuggled into Macedonia through the Novo Selo crossing. It is precisely at that crossing that other smuggling attempts have been observed: A month ago, for example, an attempt to smuggle a large amount of products from the Adidas athletic firm into Macedonia was thwarted. What is the frequency of smuggling at this crossing due to?

[Iljovski] Above all, to the closure of our northern border by the embargo against Serbia. On the other hand, the frequency of things that go beyond the limits of regular customs procedure and enter the sphere of crime are due to the crossing's insufficient technical equipment. That is why steps are being taken for its technical improvement: About $250,000 has already been received from the UN's Development Department.

[Eftov] What is the status of the Gevgelija and Bitola customs offices? At the start of the formation of the Customs Administration, there was a delay in the appointment of administrators there, and later the Bitola customs office was shaken by the scandal over the smuggling of motor vehicles.

[Iljovski] The situation has now been considerably straightened out, although we still have an acting administrator in Gevgelija. We thus still have the dilemma of whether to continue his mandate or to try to select a new administrator. Actually, the problem with the Gevgelija customs office lies in the fact that at least 20 new employees are needed there. That is the minimum for that customs office to start functioning as a complete entity.

[Eftov] Is the Novo Selo crossing under the jurisdiction of the Gevgelija customs office?

[Iljovski] Yes.

[Eftov] What about the Bitola customs office?

[Iljovski] Things have been considerably straightened out there, and in the last two months we have observed certain successes. A certain amount of weapons has been confiscated, and about one month ago, about 14 kilograms of drugs. I want to emphasize that the drugs were confiscated from two Czech citizens at the Medzitlija border crossing upon departure from Macedonia, where the inspection is much more flexible,

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because we do not have the instruments for export duties. That is why I want to emphasize that fact.

Corruption

[Eftov] In the past two years, more than 20 customs officers have been suspended. To what extent does that figure sufficiently corroborate the rumors about the corruption of customs employees? In the context of this question: If Justice Minister Vlado Popovski is requesting that judges be paid DM2,000-3,000, what, in your opinion, should be the pay of customs officers in order to avoid the danger of their corruption?

[Iljovski] Certainly corruption, as a social phenomenon, depends upon the social status of the individual. I have not been informed about what Vlado Popovski is requesting, but I think that if a customs officer is inclined toward corruption, then he will do it even if he is paid DM30,000 a month, because he is faced every day with mass transports whose cost exceed that amount several times over.

[Eftov] To what extent are these countries of southern and southeast Europe predestined to corruption in the executive branch, not to say that people are genetically predestined to it? There is the example of Turkey, Greece, Albania, Bulgaria...?

[Iljovski] I think that that is not the case just in this part of Europe. A year ago in Germany, a corruption scandal was exposed in which a member of the board of an enormous corporation embezzled about DM600 million.

[Eftov] And it wasn't one of our guest workers?

[Iljovski] It was certainly a German who managed to reach the board of Manisman, although on this issue, one might say that the very location of these countries causes a certain intensification of corrupt actions. You know that idea that Diogenes could have sat in a barrel only in Athens, and that in Siberia he probably would not have survived.

[Eftov] While we are on the subject of corruption, last year there was an announcement of special guidance that would regulate the (im)possibility of having high-level customs officers own private shipping offices in their own name, or even in the name of their close relatives.

[Iljovski] Not only high-level, but also low-level customs officials may not own shipping offices. There must not, God forbid, be any sort of "tripartite agreement," if I may put it that way, among a customs officer, a shipper, and a policeman. That way the state could be ruined overnight. I will be extremely strict on this issue.

What About the Free Shops?

[Eftov] About eight months ago, the free shops on the Macedonian-Serbian border were closed. What about them? The public is speculating about two possibilities: The state may give concessions to open free shops, or else it might open state free shops.

[Iljovski] I personally do not support a state free shop, for one reason. If previously six free shops received operating licenses, and later it was said that their owners enriched themselves by robbing the state, then if we open just one state free shop, in which 10 workers are to be employed, for instance, according to that logic we will now enrich them, but under the state's sponsorship.

[Eftov] Aren't the old free shop owners offering to pay profit taxes of up to 70 percent?

[Iljovski] That is why I say that the state should announce a public competition to establish the terms for opening duty-free shops, and the state will issue concessions for their operation.

[Eftov] How long would those concessions last—for a period of one year, as people are saying more and more often?

[Iljovski] No, one year is too short a period, in my opinion. In any case, I think that the issue of the free shops should be settled soon, but I want to emphasize that worldwide there is a trend toward a drastic increase in the number of duty-free shops that have been opened.

[Eftov] One of the reasons for the closure of the free shops on the Macedonian-Serbian border was the fact of the presence of a small number of customs officers at those crossings who were not capable of physically monitoring the trade taking place through the duty-free shops. The question is: How well staffed is Customs, and what about the training of customs officers at the Ohrid School?

[Iljovski] It is true that customs officers are poorly represented at the border crossings with Serbia. Nevertheless, we are likewise feeling the shortage of customs workers at the level of the overall customs infrastructure. That problem may be solved by 30 June, when, as a result of an agreement between the Macedonian Government and the International Monetary Fund, the state administration is to be reduced by 9 percent. At that time I think that Customs, as a service still being formed, will be permitted a certain expansion. Otherwise, a customs department has already been in operation for one year at the Ohrid School, and we as the Customs Administration are interested in closer cooperation on that issue with the school.

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[Eftov] Do you have any obligation to employ graduate customs officers?

[Iljovski] For the time being, the law does not provide for such an obligation, although we as the Customs Administration will be interested in the best students who have graduated from that school.

[Eftov] In conclusion, how much progress has been made in the work on the computerization of the customs system, and the equipment of border crossings?

[Iljovski] We are in the process of equipping the Novo Selo border crossing, as I previously said, as well as a major investment worth about $3 million, of which $1.5 million has already been provided, to upgrade the Kafasan border crossing. That crossing is very important to us, in view of the increased traffic as a result of the use of the Durres port. Likewise, preparations for the computerization of Customs are under way. For that purpose, the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program has already approved a computer center, and now, as part of a $24 million credit from the World Bank, we have received another $1 million to complete the whole installation. The whole thing has been held up, however, as a result of the slowness of PHARE's administration.

Problems of Black-Market Labor Considered

95BA0259B Skopje VECER in Macedonian 3 May 95 p 7

[Article by J.P.: "Maneuvers for the Sake of Profit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Black-market employment is nothing new here or elsewhere in the world. The difference is only that here this "evil" is being spread and tolerated, whereas in other countries, regardless of sociopolitical systems, it is sanctioned, even by the most drastic measures.

This method of the employment of the labor force by small businessmen in all sectors, especially in commerce and the hospitality industry, constitutes not only a bold exploitation of labor, but also a manipulation of the state, which is equivalent to a sort of robbery, all in order to make the biggest possible profit.

It is no secret that many of the individuals employed in the private sector have not been registered at the employment office, and contributions for social, retirement, and health insurance and other obligations, used to finance several sectors of public interest, are not being paid for them.

This type of behavior on the part of the owners of private firms naturally does not guarantee continuity of the employment record of the employees, and the creation of conditions for their subsistence in their old age, when they become unable to work. They simply accept what is imposed by the boss, although it is often in violation of laws and morality.

There are no exact data on the number of illegally employed individuals, either at the state authorities or at the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Chamber of Commerce, but it is only known that over 80,000 private firms are registered, of which only about 45,000 are in operation, and if an average of about three people are employed illegally at those alone, then an "army" of 100,000 workers are subjected to the illegal exploitation of their labor.

Experience in other countries in the world indicates that drastic measures should be taken with respect to black-market employment, the exploitation of other people's labor for the sake of personal profit, and the manipulation of the state by the nonpayment of contributions—from the imposition of high fines, to the revocation of operating licenses, to the closure of the firm.

The question that naturally arises in this regard is why that is not being done here. The answer is that black-market employment, as well as gray, black, or illegal trade, is tolerated here for the sake of some sort of social peace, but with the excuse that there are not enough inspectors and technical equipment and vehicles for supervision!? It seems, however, that this is more of an excuse than a real reason for inertia or halfhearted measures.

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KOK Continues Discussion of Entry Into NATO

LD2306091095 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1900 GMT 22 Jun 95

[Passages contained within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Defense Committee [KOK] is continuing discussion on the international aspects of Poland's security. Precise reports on the subject were tabled two weeks ago.

[Correspondent Wojciech Nomejko] KOK's meeting in Helenow near Warsaw was closed to the press. The KOK secretary stressed that its members were considering ways of convincing the West that Poland's entry into NATO will be favorable for the European security system, and, on the other hand, convincing Russia that these actions were not directed against it.

[KOK Secretary Henryk Goryszewski] "Both in the Washington pact itself, as well as...[pauses] There are regulations that say that NATO is a defensive pact, just as in the Republic's Constitution there is a clause excluding the possibility of aggressive action on the part of Poland—not to mention that we have not acted aggressively for 1,000 years [word indistinct]."

[Nomejko] During the discussion, President Lech Walesa wanted to rule out the possibility of political game-playing in the sphere of Poland's security.

[Walesa] "What goes on on some television or other, a former minister relates, somebody can exploit it—that should not happen in a serious state, where democracy is lightly established. Such things should not take place."

[Nomejko] The KOK members also discussed the Polish arms industry's difficult situation. In the opinion of the committee's secretary, we are losing too much time in this matter.

[Goryszewski] "What has been happening recently in the work, the budget work for next year, is literally horrifying. At the moment we cannot sketch a realistic horizon, calculated in decades, in which we will be able to achieve a per capita outlay on defense comparable, for instance, to powers the size of, of the economic level of France or Italy."

[Nomejko] The heads of the State Protection Office and the Military Intelligence Services also attended the meeting. [video shows members arriving at the meeting, walking in the grounds of country house]

Senate Approves Wojciechowksi as Head of KIK

LD2306103495 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2200 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Senate has expressed its agreement to the appointment of Janusz Wojciechowski as chairman of the Supreme Chamber of Control [KIK]. In a secret ballot, 39 senators voted in favor, nine were against, and four abstained. [passage omitted]

Recalled Defense Ministry Official Interviewed

WS2306123095 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 24 Jun 95 p 3

[Interview with Jerzy Milewski, former secretary of state in the Polish National Defense Ministry, by Janina Paradowska; place and date not given: "Meanders of Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Paradowska] According to some press reports, you resigned from office; according to others, you were recalled. Which version is true?

[Milewski] I was recalled by the prime minister on the motion of the national defense minister.

[Paradowska] Your dismissal became very likely the moment Piotr Kolodziejczyk ceased to be [defense] minister and when you acted against the chief of the General Staff [SG], after the well-known dinner in Drawsko. Did you still hope that you would keep your post?

[Milewski] I tried to perform my duties despite the state of uncertainty and the lack of clear prospects. After Piotr Kolodziejczyk was recalled, I temporarily ran the ministry and I waited for a new minister—theoretically, it might have been me.

[Paradowska] What was the conflict between you and the new minister all about?

[Milewski] There was no conflict. Minister Okonski came to the ministry and wanted to replace the entire leadership of the National Defense Ministry [MON]. Incidentally, such a change was to be made earlier, after the developments in Drawsko; the new minister simply started to put it into effect. As I understand it, he had the president's approval.

[Paradowska] Why exactly did you defend the minister so dramatically after the dinner in Drawsko, during the work of the Sejm commission? You certainly could have remained silent. Many did.

[Milewski] I was convinced that I should defend the authority of the office of the national defense minister, which at that time was being literally destroyed. I

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knew that this would be of vital importance to both the functioning of MON in Poland and its perception abroad. After all, our strategic goal is to obtain NATO membership. If I had acted differently at that time, it would have worked against this priority. Personally, I would also have lost face.

[Paradowska] Was and is this goal really so jeopardized by our internal disputes over power, lack of clarity, and the aspirations of military men?

[Milewski] I still consider it to be a realistic goal. Poland may achieve it by the year 2000, which would be in line with the main points of our security policy. However, the process of adapting our defense system to NATO standards is being very carefully watched by our future allies. Those who oppose our integration with NATO are quite numerous. There will be no preferential treatment. Today one of the most important conditions that Poland must meet to obtain permission from the 16 NATO members to join this organization is establishing civilian control over the Armed Forces. There is such control in our country already. However, it is too shallow, and our Western partners may consider it insufficient.

[Paradowska] What exactly does the term "shallow" mean?

[Milewski] The autonomy of the Armed Forces is too great. The term "control" is often mistaken for an inspection made by an external establishment. In reality, what it means is a system in which the Armed Forces should be just an implementation instrument in—not the maker of—the state's security policy. This means that tasks of the Armed Forces, their size and shape, should be specified by democratically elected organs of the state. In Poland, these organs are the following establishments: parliament, including the national defense commissions in both houses, the president, and the government, especially the civilian minister of national defense. There are indexes that show how advanced this control really is; they are the clarity and openness of both defense planning and the Armed Forces budget's structure. Such an index is also the openness of the Armed Forces toward the public and the media. In our country, there is no tradition of such civilian control; also, there is often not enough willingness to understand the purpose of the control. We have not sufficiently strengthened the executive structures, either. Only the office of the national defense minister has an executive apparatus in this area; however, the efficiency of its activities is low. The real possibilities of MON cells to monitor the processes going on in the Armed forces and to exert influence on them are considerably limited by the omnipotence of the GS.

[Paradowska] At a meeting with journalists, General Tadeusz Wilecki said that such control is extremely illusory because MON has not undergone any reforms whatsoever and that it continues to be a military ministry.

[Milewski] Thorough structural-organizational reforms have been carried out in the ministry. It is true, however, that we still lack educated civilian specialists in the area of defense. One of the barriers here is the fact that salaries received by civilian employees are lower compared to the salaries of military people. I do not think, however, that the fact that military specialists work in MON should be a reason for questioning control over the Armed Forces exercised by civilian politicians.

[Paradowska] I quoted a statement by Gen. Wilecki because, even though your positions are different, you paradoxically come to similar conclusions. You yourself spoke about relegating MON to the margin.

[Milewski] In a situation where the procedures of our fledgling democracy are still rather weak, an extremely important role is played by the configuration of forces, attitudes, and views in the triangle consisting of the president, the chief of staff, and the minister. In my opinion, the interpretation that extends the provisions of the small constitution toward subordinating MON and the Armed Forces entirely to the president makes it more difficult to establish the institution of the civilian defense minister. The authoritarian political aspirations of the chief of staff make things even more difficult. In our country—not only in the minds of military men, but also in the minds of ordinary people as well as politicians—the line between the military craft of training the Armed Forces and conducting war operations on the one hand and making the state's defense policy and implementing it, on the other, is not drawn very clearly. Quite common is the conviction that in defense only military people are specialists and that this area should be handled by generals. We have been accustomed to this way of thinking not only by the Polish People's Republic [PRL], but also by the legacy of the Second Republic. At that time the minister of military affairs was much lower in the hierarchy than the general inspector of the Armed Forces [GISZ], who had the rank of marshal and was the second-most-important person in the state.

[Paradowska] Ideas of establishing GISZ are reappearing today; an interesting thing is that those who speak about it point to the fact that this is what the situation looks like today in the FRG.

[Milewski] They ignore the fact, however, that the general inspector of the Bundeswehr does not have commanding powers. The people who have such powers

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are the defense minister in peacetime and the chancellor during times of war. This is an example of particularly well-developed civilian control over the Armed Forces.

[Paradowska] The civilian defense ministry has existed for several years now; there have been several civilian defense ministers. What would all those gentlemen be doing if today we woke up and called out in alarm: The GS is taking over power, MON is being pushed to the margin. What has not been done?

[Milewski] A few years ago the restructuring of the ministry was not related to Poland's integration into NATO; this resulted from the situation of the country at that time, as well as from lack of experience. The restructuring process was based on recommendations included in a report by the Commission for National Defense Organization Reform (called Minister Zabinski's commission); the report was drawn up in July 1991 and, for the first time, introduced the function of a civilian national defense minister in Poland. Previously, in the PRL as well as before World War II, MON was an exclusively military establishment. It seemed ideal at that time to create a dual structure of MON, with a civilian-military and a military section; only later did it prove to be inflammatory. In line with the model that was accepted, the chief of staff was appointed and recalled by the president on the motion of the minister. Since 1992, however, in line with the small constitution, the president has not needed the minister's motion to make these decisions. Now, if in this situation the authoritarian aspirations of the GS chief are approved by the president, who is the commander in chief of the Armed Forces, the minister is unable to prevent the civilian MON from being pushed to the margin and to stop the gradual restoration of the military ministry.

One could say that it does not matter whether MON is civilian or military as long as it is efficient. However, because it was finally decided that our strategic goal is Poland's integration into NATO, it is necessary to start thinking differently about the model of steering the Armed Forces. In NATO member states, the level of military command is confined to either the type of the Armed Forces or to operational areas. In the state, the entire control over the Armed Forces is exercised by civilian defense ministries. In the United States, this civilian control is even greater. Even individual types of the Armed Forces have their civilian secretaries—that is, ministers—there. The powers of military commanders are confined to certain areas, such as the commander of the Pacific Fleet, commander of the ground forces in Europe, etc. Higher up are only civilian organs that carry out the state's defense policy.

[Paradowska] I still do not understand why among the numerous political declarations that civilian control is indispensable, the GS continued to strengthen its position after the Drawsko lesson and the importance of the ministry diminished. Thus, we have a powerful chief of the GS, whose role is perhaps exaggerated, and a minister who humbly accompanies him. Let me ask the question once again: What did the ministers, the governments, and the National Security Office [BBN] do?

[Milewski] The ministers tried to object to this, so they often came into conflict with the chief of staff and the president. However, this is not a problem of concrete people, but a problem of the system. As I see it, we accepted a defective model. The civilian-military part of MON was to be in charge of the Armed Forces; it was to control them, handle the defense policy as well as social, educational, and other issues, and take care of supplies. The military part consists of the GS, to which the Armed Forces are fully subordinated. These two structures were supposed to cooperate with each other. However, despite the good intentions of the subsequent ministers, this model could not function well enough, and, as time passed, it led to the growing alienation of the civilian portion of the ministry. Departments of the ministry, which do not have access to the Armed Forces, must use the services of appropriate boards (equivalents of ministerial departments) in the GS. Quite naturally, the staff expanded, the individual boards did the same work as the ministry's cells, and they became independent. Therefore, they no longer needed partnership-based cooperation with the civilian departments.

[Paradowska] Ministers, however, of their own accord gave over to the GS what they might have kept, such as the Military Information Services [WSI] and the military attaches' offices. Did you try to retrieve anything?

[Milewski] Powers over the WSI were given over to the GS by Minister Kolodziejczyk; he issued an appropriate ordinance in February 1994. I admit that I was taken aback by this decision. However, the ordinance envisioned establishing a defense minister's office for information services, as well as moving the section dealing with military attaches' offices from the WSI to MON's Department of Military Foreign Affairs. Rooms were prepared for this section in the ministry, cadre decisions were made, people were employed. All of this was already prepared, and suddenly the issue got stuck. At a session of the National Defense Committee in October 1994, it was decided that the issue should be "frozen." That was all. It is frozen. Attaches' offices are, in fact, under the GS, even though formally they are

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under MON. I tried to retrieve them as acting defense minister, but I failed.

[Paradowska] This means that this structural mistake is right there in the report drawn up by Minister Zabinski's commission, does it not? Gen. Wilecki readily cites this document, claiming that he implements its decisions literally. Incidentally, your signature is on that document.

[Milewski] I am not a signatory, but I did take part in the work of the commission, and I thought at that time that we were approving a very good concept. Today I dare say that the concept of a dual MON is wrong, even though you will find its defenders not only in the GS but also in political circles. Now that I have taken a close look at the way the model is functioning, I am convinced that we will not overcome the problem of restructuring the Armed Forces and the problem of civilian control unless we give up the concept of a dual ministry. We should have an integrated leadership of MON, and each section, each cell in the ministry should have direct access to the Armed Forces; the GS should cease to play the role of a commanding organ of the entire Armed Forces—it should become an organ of tactical and operational planning, as well as an organ dealing with the training of the Armed Forces. Military command should not reach further than the individual types of the Armed Forces. Therefore, we should set up a Commanding Staff of the Ground Troops, which we do not have. Then the commanders of individual types of the Armed Forces, or commanders of the military districts—if the districts are maintained—should be subordinated directly to the national defense minister; they should also be appointed and recalled on his motion, as was done in the past. Incidentally, in line with the old but still binding law, the national defense minister has authority over the Armed Forces through the GS chief, as well as through commanders of the Armed Forces and military districts. This provision of the law should be maintained.

[Paradowska] Is it not so that yet another restructuring process must be carried out to deprive a certain ambitious general of obtaining excessive powers?

[Milewski] Certainly not. This is not only a problem of specific individuals. Any GS chief, if he is situated in this way, will rise above the minister. Such a situation would be avoided in an integrated MON structure.

[Paradowska] You cooperated with the president for a long period of time—you cooperated with him in issues related to the state's security as well. Do you think the president understands and feels what the civilian control over the Armed Forces should mean in practice?

[Milewski] I do not think he does; he may also understand it, but not entirely. The president said on numerous occasions that he considered the generals to be the only expert people as far as issues of the country's defense are concerned. It is easy to infer from this that, according to the president, all issues related to the security policy should be handled by military people, not by civilians. Minister Okonski stated recently that "we probably are not mature enough yet to accept West European models of commanding the Armed Forces." I really would like him to see to it that this rate of "maturing" is as quick as possible because there may be no room in NATO for those who are immature.

[Paradowska] You wanted to go to MON yourself; it was not a decision forced by the Belweder. Now that you have split with the ministry do you feel embittered that you have lost even though you supported a good cause?

[Milewski] Indeed, I did want to come here, and I suggested this to Piotr Kolodziejczyk when he received his ministerial nomination. Then we both asked the president and the prime minister for approval. I believed that especially in MON it was possible to do quite a lot for our integration with NATO, which I had supported strongly since I came back to Poland in 1990. The BBN has no legal prerogatives to do anything. No one told me that I performed my duties poorly—on the contrary. I am satisfied that I managed to organize the section of the secretary of state in MON and set up in this section the department of the defense system, which was moved as a whole from the BBN. I also believe that the idea of integrating into NATO was implemented correctly here. I am convinced that Andrzej Karkoszka, with whom I cooperated and who will fill the post I have vacated, will continue to implement the issues that have been begun. However, I undoubtedly lost the battle for changes in the structures of the MON leadership and for further restructuring of the Armed Forces to adjust them to current tasks; of course, the restructuring would be determined by the financial resources that our state could earmark for this purpose.

[Paradowska] You were one of very few politicians of the Solidarity camp who remained among high-ranking state officials. Now you are leaving.

[Milewski] It looks as though my task was to regain the conditions to establish a democratic system; however, perhaps there were not enough people in this camp who knew how to implement this system step by step and consistently. Those who were not active in the opposition had the time to acquire greater knowledge on the functioning of the state, the establishment of political

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parties, and the functioning of democracy. Now they are reaping benefits from that.

[Paradowska] In 1980 you were one of those who set up Solidarity ["S"] in the Institute of Fluid-Flow Machines in Gdansk. Then you established the "network" of big industrial plants; you promoted the ideas of employees' self-government; when Martial Law was introduced in Poland, you ran the "S" office in Brussels; and, finally, you were appointed a minister by President Lech Walesa. Which period do you consider to be the best in you life?

[Milewski] It was when I was in Brussels. This was most important to me; it was also a necessary and unique experience for me. I joined this activity without actually thinking much about it. I left Poland for a week, and when Martial Law was introduced, I was abroad. Instead of a week, I stayed abroad for nine years. We managed to affiliate the delegalized "S" with two international trade union centers: the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the World Labor Confederation. We also received considerable financial aid. These were great causes. Thus, my activity had a very concrete dimension. Everything I did later on, after 1989, was a continuation of those activities—we overthrew communism and it was necessary to build a democratic state. This turned out to be a much more difficult task.

Floating Zloty Makes No Waves

95EP0140A Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish 28 May 95 No 22, p 11

[Article by (BZ): "Soft Landing. The NBP Did Not Intervene. Rates Offered by Foreign Currency Traders Approximated Those Set by the Bank"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It would have been naive to believe that immediately after the release of the exchange rate radical changes would occur: The market would prove that the exchange rate of the zloty was artificial, whereas banks will allow themselves to play aggressively against the NBP [National Bank of Poland]. The initial days had to be relatively calm because everybody wanted to get used to new principles. If nothing else, prudence was seen in a large difference between buying and selling rates first quoted, as if it was assumed from the very beginning that the rates were strictly for reference.

The central bank verified rates offered by dealers but, in keeping with its previous announcements, resolved to allow some time for adjustment to new conditions. The bank did not intervene a single time. It is another matter that the bank did not have to because relative quiet prevailed in the market.

The volume was small. The zloty gained more than 2 percent in value against the dollar. This was growth accepted by the NBP. Let us recall that deviations of plus or minus 7 percent are permissible, and actually only exceeding them will raise an alarm. Of course, depending on its assessment of the market, the NBP may consider much smaller deviations desirable. This information will be conveyed to the banks in the form of intervening purchases or sales of currencies.

The closing of foreign exchange positions by banks also proceeded without problems. Smaller banks usually did this on the interbank market, whereas larger banks engaged in transactions with the NBP. However, the scale of such transactions was not particularly large. Initially, the banks bought more than they sold. This could have resulted from the fact that they maintained short dollar positions before the zloty was floated, being apprehensible of the appreciation of our currency. Then the banks closed the positions by purchasing foreign exchange.

All transactions were effected at the fixing (rate of the day) set by the NBP on the basis of quotations by the banks that decided to engage in operations with the NBP. Fixing applies to just two currencies: the U.S. dollar and the German mark. Let us recall that previously the central bank allowed operations in five principal currencies belonging to the currency basket.

A marked strengthening of the dollar on international markets last week was a factor that facilitated the soft landing. Projections for the immediate future are also favorable for the dollar, which may be something of a stabilizing influence on the Polish market and delay (perhaps mitigate) the expected depreciation of the dollar against the zloty. This would also mean less pressure from exporters, who are very apprehensive about the profitability of exports.

Currency exchange rates offered by foreign currency traders remained at a level below that set by the NBP; however, this difference has diminished considerably. The margin collected by the foreign currency traders increased markedly only on Tuesday, the day the zloty was floated. It subsequently returned to the regular level of less than 2 groszy.

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Melescanu Submits EU Application to Chirac

AU2306061195 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Romania's Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu returned tonight from Paris, where he submitted to the French Presidency of the European Union [EU] the official application for Romania's association with the European Union, together with the strategy of preparations for Romania's association and a political declaration adopted yesterday by all parliamentary political parties.

Teodor Melescanu made the following press statement at Otopeni Airport, in which he stressed the importance of this step taken by Romania:

[Begin Melescanu recording] I could say that maybe the most important element of this act, which I dare to call historic, is the irreversible decision taken by Romania to choose for its future, a zone of prosperity, welfare, and stability, that is—to achieve our country's integration with countries with whom we share identical values and concerns.

I would also like to say that the official act of submitting this application makes Romania enter a new group, and I am convinced that this group that we have entered, namely the group of associate countries that have expressed their clear option to become EU members with full rights, will also offer our delegation led by President Ion Iliescu who will participate in the summit in Cannes next week, the opportunity to make a greater contribution than ever before to establishing objectives that the European Union will set itself in connection with its expansion, association with countries that expressed their wish to become EU members.

In conclusion, I would also like to say that the act of submitting this application, which expresses this irrevocable decision taken by Romania, will also have a most positive effect on the efforts Romania is currently making towards integration in other European and Euro-Atlantic bodies. I am primarily referring to NATO and the Western European Union. I think that this is an extremely important act, and I dare to qualify it as a historic act, which I believe and am convinced will have extremely important consequences for the future of our country and for the Romanian people's prosperity, stability, and welfare. I also believe that this act has become possible and has had so much importance precisely because it has enjoyed very broad support, the support of all of Romanian society. (end recording)

Melescanu on Hungarian Rights, Economic Standing

AU2206143295 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 22 Jun 95 p 3

[Interview with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by Eric Frey in Bucharest; date not given: "No Country Has Achieved So Much So Quickly"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Frey] Unlike Slovakia, Romania did not conclude a basic treaty with Hungary in March; the negotiations have stalled. Are you still interested in such a treaty?

[Melescanu] There is a real determination to conclude such a treaty as quickly as possible. We expect a result very soon. We want to solve the last open questions, in particular the Council of Europe Recommendation 1201, which is, unfortunately, identified with a call for territorial autonomy in our country. Therefore, it is massively rejected by the political class.

[Frey] But when Romania joined the Council of Europe, it accepted Recommendation 1201?

[Melescanu] Romania has accepted all Council of Europe recommendations and is determined to fulfill them. Number 1201 only says that the Council of Europe adopts a framework convention about the rights of minorities. This has been done. Romania has signed it and it is the only country that has ratified it. Nevertheless, it is difficult to convince everyone that we have to accept Recommendation 1201 in the treaty with Hungary.

[Frey] The rhetoric about the alleged dangers of autonomy is alarming for many people.

[Melescanu] This is no metaphysical fear. One reason for this is the latest congress of the Democratic Union of Hungarians [in Romania—UDMR], where extreme statements were made. I am aware that the extremists do not speak for all Hungarians, but these statements do have a negative effect.

[Frey] The Hungarians say that their demands are based on the Constitution.

[Melescanu] We are preparing compromise formulas for the Hungarians that contain a clear commitment to local autonomy and a decentralization of public services. Autonomy is good for all communities, not just for minorities.

[Frey] The Council of Europe is not satisfied with the speed of changes in Romania.

[Melescanu] There is criticism on individual points. But this is normal. The Romanians themselves are most strongly interested in democratization. We see these

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as valuable recommendations, which are helping us to speed up the process.

[Frey] Recently there have been protests against a decree by your ministry that Romanies are to be called "tigan" (Gypsies) to avoid confusion with Romanians.

[Melescanu] There has been no such decree. There was just an analysis about the terms used in different countries. We do not force names on anyone. It is a pity that this is being turned into an issue when there are so many other problems that have nothing to do with their name but with their training and their position in the society.

[Frey] When the EU and NATO speak of expansion to the east, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are mentioned, but Romania is often left out. Are you worried about this?

[Melescanu] It merely reflects the opinion of individuals, because the official position rules out discrimination between individual candidates. NATO is just working out criteria for expansion. How can certain countries be preferred as long as the criteria have not been set down?

[Frey] In the EU the criteria are clear. Economically, Romania lags behind the other reform countries.

[Melescanu] If one compares Romania and Hungary, then Romania is lagging behind. But if one looks at what has happened here over the past five years, while the Hungarian reforms started in 1956, it can be seen that Romania is moving the faster. In 1990, the private share in the economy was zero, today it is 35 percent. No other country has achieved so much in such a short time.

[Frey] But the government party continues to represent the nomenklatura of the past. The elites have hardly changed.

[Melescanu] No one in the government party belongs to the past nomenklatura. Hungary's Prime Minister Gyula Horn is a former minister; the former Romanian ministers are in prison or dead. Of course, people can be found in the administration who were also there in the past. We destroyed communism but not the communists. But we could not shoot everyone; after all, there were 12 million of them.

Mohora Appointed Chairman of Socialist Party

AU2306083295 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 19 Jun 95 p 1

[Article by Rodica Ciobanu: "The Socialist Party Congress—New Ideas, Old Speeches; Tudor Mohora Elected Party Chairman"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Finally the Socialist Party has settled from an organizational viewpoint. It has now a National Council, an Executive Committee and an Executive Bureau, as well as a chairman. It also has branches in all counties, and according to official figures it also has 12,500 registered members. This is a real achievement if we think of the fact that this party was established five months ago, through the split of the Mohora group from the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor]. The first congress of this party ended in Bucharest yesterday. The participants in the congress endorsed the program and the statute of the Socialist Party, both documents allowing for amendments at the extraordinary congress to take place this autumn.

The Socialist Party attempted to define itself in relation with other left-wing parties and mainly the PSM and the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania]. The party, led by Tudor Mohora, wishes to become the promoter of a modern socialism, its goal being to instate a social rule of law state, social solidarity and justice, as well as a market economy. However, the generous goals presented in the program and in the statute were in contradiction with the majority of speeches delivered at the meeting. The nationalist tone and old-type expressions prevailed, thus, the listeners had the impression that they had heard the speeches before.

The speakers severely criticized the state of today's economy and society, saying that the responsibility for the current state of affairs rests with the PDSR and its ruling allies. During this meeting the speakers did not suggest solutions for reviving the economy, however they stated that they wish to launch a new option on the political market. Tudor Mohora seems to continue to be the only remarkable figure in this party. However, neither he, nor anybody else could provide an answer to the question whether the Socialist Party is a party that supports those in power or the opposition. For the

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time being, the socialists seem to pursue the policy promoted by Cornel Vadim Tudor [Greater Romania Party chairman] and by Ilie Verdet [Socialist Party of Labor chairman] who, in fact, are siding with the government and the PDSR, though they never miss an opportunity to launch an attack. However, unlike these parties, the Socialist Party has given up being hermetic. It seems more transparent, more open toward renewal, and more determined to find its own way on the left of the political arena. To what extent will it be a real alternative to the current left-wing parties? Let us wait till autumn.

Yesterday afternoon, the National Council appointed Tudor Mohora chairman of the Socialist Party.

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Drnovsek Discusses Balkan Issues, EU, NATO

PY2206164095 Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 20 Jun 95 p 12

[Interview with Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek by Avedis Hadjian; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Hadjian] How did the fact that you were president of Yugoslavia help you to reconstruct a state that has not been independent for 1,000 years?

[Drnovsek] It was an interesting experience. I was elected Yugoslav president in Slovenia's first democratic elections, in 1989. It was a very difficult and important experience. Yugoslavia was in crisis. It was a great challenge. The experience helped me when we needed to create a new Slovene state during these first independent years. It was not easy. Our first achievement was to get out of the Yugoslav conflict without much damage or many victims. This was possible, without a doubt, thanks to my experience as president of the old Yugoslav Republic.

[Hadjian] What did Slovenia give up in order to achieve a quick and almost bloodless understanding with Serbia?

[Drnovsek] There were two important factors. The first was that Slovenia did not have a Serbian minority, like Croatia or Bosnia Herzegovina. This is why it was easier to negotiate with Serbia. Second, Slovenia successfully defended itself from a Federal Army intervention after it declared independence.

[Hadjian] Could Slovenia soon resume diplomatic relations with Serbia? How would that affect Croatia's domestic policies or Croatia's relations with Serbia?

[Drnovsek] Slovenia will not have any problem establishing diplomatic relations with Serbia once the situation in the old Yugoslav Republic and Bosnia-Herzegovina returns to normal. Besides, the international community must accept Serbia in its midst, and Serbia must accept an international peace plan first. We will not establish closer links until the international community takes the first step. I suppose Croatia will act in a similar way.

[Hadjian] The French Government sustained that, had it not been for Germany, which quickly recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, it would have been possible to reformulate the Yugoslav federation, an idea that George Bush's administration seemed to support when James Baker visited Serbia in October 1990. Do you think it was possible to save Yugoslavia?

[Drnovsek] I do not think so. We discussed the issue in Slovenia before. We thought we could transform the federation, perhaps establish a confederation, as the basis for greater political independence between the republics. But we were not able to do so, and I do not think it would have been possible to prevent the disintegration of the republic, which was an artificial state created in 1918, after the First World War, during the autocratic rule of Tito.

[Hadjian] If you had to choose your most difficult mission between presiding over Yugoslavia during its more critical hours, negotiating the withdrawal of the Federal Army, or ruling over an independent Slovenia, what would you choose?

[Drnovsek] I had very delicate moments during my presidency of Yugoslavia. One of my most delicate crisis involved managing a tense situation between Serbs and Albanians in the Kosovo region.

[Hadjian] Could war have broken out in Kosovo?

[Drnovsek] It could have. We also went through very tense hours when the Yugoslav Army attacked Croatia and Slovenia. The negotiations leading to the withdrawal of the Federal Army were extenuating. I can only guess what would have happened had Serbia forced its viewpoints on the other parties during the negotiations.

[Hadjian] Could the Yugoslav disintegration have been worse?

[Drnovsek] Not much. We were able to separate Slovenia. Macedonia was also able to obtain its independence. I do not need to say that Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were not as successful.

[Hadjian] Slovene economic indicators are quite favorable even though the transition to economic liberalism is usually difficult. Could we have reduced state participation in our economic life in the style of Vaclav Klaus [in the Czech Republic]?

[Drnovsek] That is interesting. In Slovenia we implemented a very liberal system, and we are trying to sign free trade agreements with other countries. Ours is a very small country and we must export. We have been able to avoid the tensions typical of a transition period. We have an unemployment rate of 9 percent, which is slightly higher than in the Czech Republic. This means Slovenia has reorganized its economy and its companies have adapted to more difficult conditions.

[Hadjian] Are you concerned over victories by former communists in other East European countries?

[Drnovsek] I am not concerned because the system changed. We now have a parliamentary system. The former communists may win this time, but the other

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parties will win the next time. It is not dangerous because neither group wants to remove the parliamentary system and replace it with the old Communist system.

[Hadjian] You have said that it was easier for Slovenia to join NATO because it was not included Russia's geopolitical interests. But why join NATO if you do not have open or potential enemies?

[Drnovsek] I consider NATO, now that we no longer have blocs, as a sphere of stability and security that must extend its influence to other areas in Europe. We do not need a specific enemy to join NATO. It is a circle with political stability. Other parts of Europe have more tensions and are more unstable. NATO must grow to make this instability disappear. It does not revolve around a specific enemy.

[Hadjian] Why did Communism fail?

[Drnovsek] It was economically inefficient?

[Hadjian] Economically inefficient? What about the moral aspects?

[Drnovsek] In principle, the system failed because it could not stand up economically. The system could not continue without democracy considering the development of communications and information. Had the system found economic solutions it would have continued for a longer time.

Thaler Outlines Foreign Policy Strategy

AU2306111595 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 22 Jun 95

[Report on a news conference by Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler by Nadja Pengov in Ljubljana on 22 June—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] So far, there have been four attempts to pass a document entitled "The Strategy of Slovenia's Foreign Policy." This latest version is the fourth in a row. The process of the adoption of the third proposal came to a halt in the second half of the previous year when the then foreign minister resigned.

The current proposal contains 26 pages. The foreign minister's council has discussed it twice, which gives it a certain expert quality, Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler believes.

As for its content, the foreign policy is not in and of itself a goal, but is aimed at implementing of the fundamental national interests. For that reason the sovereignty of our country comes first. The proposed document gives an important place to the relations with neighboring countries, closer cooperation with the European countries, cooperation with the countries that have a decisive influence over the international trends, and cooperation in the international organizations.

In his replies to a few questions, Minister Thaler said that Slovenia was preoccupied by the efforts for as rapid as possible integration with the European Union. As he said, it is the way and not only the goal that matters. He thinks that we have nevertheless succeeded in continuing the process. The agreement with the European Union has been initialed.

On 12 June, we knew already that Slovenia would not be invited to Cannes. However, we checked anyway to see if something could nevertheless be done. One of the EU countries was opposed to it, and, as there was no consensus, we postponed a step toward the European Union to some other occasion.

The government at today's session also showed a consensus for the opening of a consulate of the Republic of Croatia in Maribor.

IMF Hails Economy, Urges Pension Reform

AU2306103195 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 15 Jun 95 p 3

[Article by Miha Jenko: "IMF: Slovene Economic Achievements Could Serve as Example"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 14 July—A regular IMF mission during a two-week visit to Slovenia concluded that "the achievements of the economic polices pursued by the Slovene authorities last year could in many respects serve as an example: Inflation this year is supposed to be down to a single digit while it appears that the economic growth will be 5 percent. The transitional period, too, is proving shorter and less difficult that in any other country," mission head Russell Kincaid said.

Among the main future challenges for Slovenia, according to him, is a continued growth of the real GDP simultaneously with low inflation. This is difficult because Slovenia is entering a new phase of transition, characterized by a greater nominal stability. The best example for this is the stability of the Slovene tolar in relation to the German mark, which poses economic and psychological challenges: People are becoming increasingly used to low inflation and a stable exchange rate. We support the monetary policy that leads toward greater stability and lower inflation, as well as the efforts of the Bank of Slovenia to abolish the indexation of capital, he said.

With More Flexible Salaries to Firmer Currency

Regarding exchange rate policy, he also said that the wage policy is extremely important and should

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contribute to a firm currency. The wage policy should be more flexible, to favor more dynamic and lucrative enterprises. The mission supports the budgetary plans and, as he says, the budget "to a great extent matches" the Slovene macroeconomic requirements. However, there are problems that will have to be resolved over the next few years, primarily concerning pensions and health insurance, he said, since with the aging of the population deficits in this sphere will grow. Kincaid was also critical of the level of contributions for these purposes. As he said, a political as well as a social solution will have to be found "to balance out the share between young and old, healthy and sick, and among various groups in Slovenia."

To a DELO question as to how he commented on the fact that hardly anything happened although IMF and World Bank missions constantly recommended reforms of the above systems, the guests from abroad pointed at the political sensitivity of this project. Labor Minister Klinar added here that the government was preparing a reform of the pensions and health care system, which could last 10 to 12 years and was technically and financially very demanding.

Need for Radical Reform of Pensions System

Bank of Slovenia Vice Governor Andrej Rant in the introduction said that in "the frank and exhausting" talks with the mission there was also some discussion about the exchange rate policy, but primarily of the wage policy and the pension insurance. They exposed a need for a radical reform of the pension system: In its present form it can threaten the stabilization efforts of the Slovene economy, he said. They also concluded that Slovenia was entering a new phase of stabilization, which also requires stabilization and nomination of the financial relations. "For this reason we discussed at great length the abolition of indexation and further measures with which we would accomplish nominal financial stability of the economy. This is also important to boost competitiveness on the markets where Slovenia is selling its goods."

When asked why Slovenia does not declare external convertibility of the tolar, Kincaid said that the Slovene Government only needed to inform the IMF of it. The reason that this has not yet happened lies primarily in some ambiguities, primarily the one surrounding the issue of the debts of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] to ICC [a consortium of commercial banks]. A recent agreement with the banks will create an opportunity for the reexamination of the situation in this realm. Kincaid was of the opinion that the financial rehabilitation of the banks is running "quite quickly and effectively." As for the slow pace of the privatization of banks, he said that one of the main reasons for it was the lack of coordination in the foreign currency part of the banks' balance of accounts pertaining to the financial rehabilitation bonds. Finance Minister Mitja Gaspari here said that the government was planning to come out with a law on the restructuring of the bonds for financial rehabilitation of banks in 10 days, while the law on the financial rehabilitation of banks will be ready in September.

[Box, p 3]

Russell Kincaid hailed the Slovene agreement with commercial banks: The agreement with them will also help reduce interest rates in Slovenia and allow Slovene companies access to international capital. He described the agreement as a milestone that will facilitate Slovenia's more active participation in the world economy. Willy Kiekens, the head of the Belgian constituency (to which Slovenia belongs), was of a similar opinion. He said that the New York agreement was acceptable to both sides. With unpaid debts, Slovenia would find it difficult to feature on the foreign financial markets at a lesser cost. It is expected that it will become more attractive for foreign investors with the signing of the agreement.

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Federal

Jovanovic: Settlement 'Based on Equal Respect'

LD2206195695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1428 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sofia, June 22 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic has told the Bulgarian TV Channel Two that a political settlement in Bosnia is possible only if based on equal respect for the legitimate interests and rights of all warring sides.

Jovanovic said that all international mediators and institutions were exerting major efforts toward a political settlement acceptable for all, but that these efforts had so far faced insurmountable obstacles. Jovanovic said he believed that such efforts should continue. He said that, to this end, Yugoslavia was and still is making a major contribution, being absolutely committed to getting the political process back on track and to helping the leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by reducing the degree of the international community's bias, reach a final political settlement on the basis of the Contact Group plan.

He said it would be much easier to find the political settlement if this was only up to the Bosnian warring sides—Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. However, Jovanovic said, the warring sides, especially the Bosnian Muslims, depend on others and cannot fully pursue their own policy even if they want to.

He said Yugoslavia believed that the Contact Group plan, despite its shortcomings, could provide a starting point for the restoration of political talks and expected the Bosnian Serb leadership to finally realize that the plan, although it did not provide everything, offered a solution acceptable for all.

Jovanovic said Bosnia, as well as the entire former Yugoslavia, had during the development of the crisis become a battleground of foreign interests, fighting for the presence of their influence and even spheres of influence, making it difficult to achieve a general peace agreement. He said that beside the UN, which had become engaged there on a legal basis in order to preserve or restore peace, there were also major powers' interests as well as interests of many countries that have troops within the UN force there. He said that some influential Islamic factors had especially been engaged there.

Jovanovic pointed out Greece and Bulgaria, from among the countries with an impartial stand toward the Yugoslav crisis, which had more than once very positively and boldly declared themselves in favor of peace and against outside interference. However, he said, there were also countries that had played a very negative role in the Bosnian-Yugoslav crisis and were still doing so, singling out Turkey and Albania.

Jovanovic said that if the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina was settled in the near future and if these countries corrected their negative stands, Yugoslavia might restore normal relations with them and build them up to the mutual interests.

Speaking about the future of the Balkans, Jovanovic opted for a regional Balkan community, be it called a customs union, a common market, or something even more ambitious such as a confederation or a federation.

Jovanovic Views Arab-Yugoslav Relations

LD2206202895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1527 GMT 22 Jun 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 22 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Assistant Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic said here Thursday that Israel, Jordan, and Egypt were determined to play a role in the process of a peaceful settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

Jovanovic told a news conference organized by the Yugoslav-Arab Society that the "very positive" impression was based on the talks held during his tour of the three countries last week.

Jovanovic said he hoped Yugoslavia would resume cooperation with the three countries, but set out that some prejudices in the Arab world relating to Yugoslavia would have to be eliminated.

Jovanovic said the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry would welcome every initiative for the setting up of societies such as the Yugoslav-Arab one, and especially with peoples with which Yugoslavia was bound by a long tradition and years of cooperation.

President of the Yugoslav-Arab Society Rade Bozovic told the press that cooperation between Yugoslavia and Arab countries had a long tradition.

He said about 15,000 Arab students had attended Yugoslav universities and the University of Belgrade had had for 70 years a department of oriental studies.

Publicist Milutin Milenkovic said it was necessary to build bridges and not bunkers, in view of the fact that Arabs possessed three strategic weapons—oil, the Suez Canal, and immense funds.

"The role the Arabs will play in the world community in the future and their cooperation with us will depend on

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the outcome of the conflict between the Arab conscience and Islamic fundamentalism," Milenkovic said.

Prime Minister Receives ICRC President

LD2206212695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1654 GMT 22 Jun 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 22 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic upheld in a talk with ICRC [International Committe of the Red Cross] President Cornelio Sommaruga the organization's appeal to the warring sides and the world public to secure normal conditions for the Red Cross activities in the war-affected parts of the former Yugoslavia.

Kontic paid recognition to the International Committee of the Red Cross and its President Sommaruga for everything done at the humanitarian level in the former Yugoslavia so far, a federal government statement said.

Our country highly appreciates the ICRC's principled and unbiased stand in aiding the war-affected civilian population, Kontic told Sommaruga.

Both sides set out that the ICRC was acting in difficult political and military conditions and that the warring sides' minimal consensus on humanitarian issues was indispensable, the statement said.

Sommaruga expressed satisfaction with the cooperation to date between the ICRC and the Yugoslav Red Cross and said he hoped it would continue to be so in the future, too.

Kontic underscored opposition to the implementation of sanctions against any people, in the name of humanism above all, the government statement said.

FRY To Participate in Satellite TV System

LD2206233995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1654 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Budapest, 22 Jun (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—FRY] is one of 25 countries in Central and East Europe which has signed an agreement in Budapest on setting up a regional satellite television network called Alpha, Milan Atanackovic, the head of our delegation, told TANJUG today.

The agreement to set up the international Alpha foundation, signed by representatives of the Visegrad countries, the Balkan countries (including all the states which seceded from Yugoslavia), and states of the former Soviet Union, envisages the collection of funds for the lease of a satellite channel, probably on Eutelsat, in other words the expansion of cooperation in the cultural and economic sphere. [passage omitted]

Serbia

Milosevic Assures Bildt, Stoltenberg on Peace

LD2206142095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1332 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 22 June (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Thorvald Stoltenberg and Carl Bildt, the cochairmen of the international conference on former Yugoslavia, who are paying a visit to Belgrade with their aides.

A statement from the Serbian president's office says that an extensive exchange of views on the most important issues of the peace process has been carried out, and that an agreement was reached in the stand that there can be no military solution to the crisis in this area.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] has been making a continuous and persistent contribution to the development and the progress of the peace process; FRY represents the main factor of peace and stability in the Balkans. It has consistently been advocating the normalization of overall relations in this area and the achievement of equality between all the players in the Yugoslav crisis, without which a permanent political solution is impossible, the statement says.

The talks were also attended by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic.

Stoltenberg, Bildt Brief Press

AU2206161595 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic held talks with peace mediators Thorvald Stoltenberg and Carl Bildt. After the talks, cochairmen Stoltenberg and Bildt held a brief news conference. Zarko Simovic reports:

[Begin recording] Addressing the correspondents, Thorvald Stoltenberg said that he and Carl Bildt are now on tour, of which the aim is to (?acquire) fresh impressions and assess the situation. We have held talks with key personages; today we talked with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for more than four hours.

The new peace mediator, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt said, among other things, the following:

[Bildt in English with superimposed report in Serbo-Croatian read by Simovic] My task is to see what can be done now in the talks with the prime ministers. I have listened more than talked in order to be able to assess

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the situation and present these assessments of mine to the EU leaders, whom I will meet at the summit in (?Cannes) on 26 June. [end recording]

[Simovic] Carl Bildt said once again that a political process has been opened. At the moment, we are talking (?above all) about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina where [word indistinct] has been disturbed.

According to Bildt, the situation in Bosnia at this moment is characterized by the cessation of political negotiations, as well as an increase in conflicts and in the people's suffering.

According to Bildt, the humanitarian situation is very grave and the position of the Blue Helmets unenviable as well. I think, Bildt went on to say, that we are now at a critical point and we must be ready to react swiftly. In reply to the correspondents' question as to whether he has started a new peace initiative, Carl Bildt said that he is still assessing the situation because this is what precedes any new move.

Carl Bildt then reiterated his view that the situation in Bosnia is very grave, that things sometimes take a wrong direction, and that the international community does not have much time to seek a peace solution to the Yugoslav crisis. [end recording]

Bildt Issues Statement

LD2206182595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1759 GMT 22 Jun 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 22 (TANJUG)—EU mediator Carl Bildt said here Thursday his priority was to meet with all key figures in the former Yugoslavia and then possibly to propose the initiating of a political process.

Bildt and Thorvald Stoltenberg, who co-chair the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, conferred with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for four hours on Thursday.

Following the talks, Bildt, former Swedish conservative premier, said he might be able to present some proposals for initiating a political process, at a EU summit in Cannes, France, on June 26-27.

Bildt said that at this point all talks focused on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, torn apart by civil war for more than three years, describing the situation as very disturbing in the political, humanitarian and every other sense.

It is believed therefore that we have reached the critical point and must be ready to act in the near future, he said.

Bildt described as disturbing the fact that fighting might intensify and that UN troops might withdraw, despite the currently positive presence of the Rapid Reaction Force.

Putting humanitarian efforts and lives of UN troops in jeopardy cannot be tolerated for long, he said.

Bildt said he would like Bosnian Serb officials to join the peace process, saying they had excluded themselves from the peace process by failing to accept what other warring sides had accepted.

Bosnian Serb leaders have refused to accept elements of the Contact Group plan proposed last July, giving 51 percent of the territory to the Moslem-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs.

Bildt also said the issue of suspending the sanctions against Yugoslavia would soon have to be put on the agenda. The U.N. Security Council imposed comprehensive and mandatory sanctions on the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro in late May 1992, for alleged involvement in the civil war in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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